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Non-Technical Summary 
 
This paper presents new evidence on the controversial issue of corporate capital structure, by 
examining the way that corporations finance their growth. We take the view that corporate capital 
structures are the result of past financing decisions, so that the best way to understand current 
capital structures is to analyze the financing decisions that gave rise to them. Our main 
contribution is to provide empirical evidence of a link between corporate financing decisions and 
managerial incentives, and to show how this link provides an explanation for the poor returns that 
are realized by firms that rely heavily on debt to finance their asset growth. We label this new 
motive for debt financing the ‘making the numbers’ hypothesis. The basic idea is that reported 
earnings are a major concern for managers, who therefore take account of the effect of financing 
decisions on reported earnings. When the cost of debt is less than the earnings-price ratio debt 
financing will tend to raise reported earnings per share, making debt financing especially attractive 
to managers under these conditions. And the ‘making the numbers’ motive will be strongest when 
managers are under pressure to perform as a result of poor past performance, of over-optimistic 
analyst expectations, or of declining profitability. We do not claim that this is the whole story of 
financing decisions. Undoubtedly, other considerations also are at work, and indeed we find 
evidence that is consistent with market timing and signaling as well as with managing earnings.  
 
The ‘making the numbers’ or MTN hypothesis is motivated by the observation that executive 
compensation schemes do not take explicit account of risk, being typically based on share prices, 
earnings per share, or return on equity metrics. Other things equal, managers would prefer that 
the risk of their firms be low since much of the manager’s wealth and human capital are tied up in 
the firm. However, to the extent that most compensation contracts have option like features as a 
result of limited liability, a manager has an incentive to increase risk through leverage, and to ‘roll 
the dice’, when future prospects look relatively poor. The MTN hypothesis is consistent with the 
evidence that when issuing equity, respondents are concerned about earnings per share dilution 
and recent stock price appreciation. It is also consistent with the evidence that managers place a 
very high importance on earnings rather than on cash flows or other metrics, as well as with the 
evidence that managers manage earnings to beat analyst expectations. 
 
To summarize, we provide new evidence that managerial concerns are of importance in financing 
decisions. These concerns will differ according to the condition of the firm and the manager and 
the terms and security of employment. It is unlikely that our primarily linear specifications have 
captured adequately the interactions between the various considerations that are important. But 
we hope to have shown that managerial concerns deserve a more important role in positive 
theories and empirical studies of corporate financing. Financing Asset Growth
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Abstract: In this paper we provide new evidence that corporate ﬁnancing decisions are
associated with managerial incentives to report high equity earnings. Managers rely most heavily
on debt to ﬁnance their asset growth when their future earnings prospects are poor, when they are
under pressure due to past declines in earnings, negative past stock returns, and excessively optimistic
analyst earnings forecasts, and when the earnings yield is high relative to bond yields so that from an
accounting perspective equity is ‘expensive’. Managers of high debt issuing ﬁrms are more likely to
be newly appointed and also more likely to be replaced in subsequent years.
Abnormal returns on portfolios formed on the basis of asset growth and debt issuance are strongly
positively associated with the contemporaneous changes in returns on assets and on equity as well
as with earnings surprises. This may account for the ﬁnding that debt issuance forecasts negative
abnormal returns, since debt issuance also forecasts negative changes in returns on assets and on
equity and negative earnings surprises.
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11 Introduction
In this paper we present new evidence on the controversial issue of corporate capital structure, by
examining the way that corporations ﬁnance their growth. We take the view advanced by Myers
(1984) and Baker and Wurgler (2002) that corporate capital structures are the result of past ﬁnancing
decisions, so that the best way to understand current capital structures is to analyze the ﬁnancing
decisions that gave rise to them. Our main contribution is to provide empirical evidence of a link
between corporate ﬁnancing decisions and managerial incentives,1 and to show how this link provides
an explanation for the poor returns that are realized by ﬁrms that rely heavily on debt to ﬁnance their
asset growth. We label this new motive for debt ﬁnancing the ‘making the numbers’ hypothesis. The
basic idea is that reported earnings are a major concern for managers, who therefore take account of the
eﬀect of ﬁnancing decisions on reported earnings. When the cost of debt is less than the earnings-price
ratio debt ﬁnancing will tend to raise reported earnings per share, making debt ﬁnancing especially
attractive to managers under these conditions. And the ‘making the numbers’ motive will be strongest
when managers are under pressure to perform as a result of poor past performance, of over-optimistic
analyst expectations, or of declining proﬁtability. We do not claim that this is the whole story of
ﬁnancing decisions. Undoubtedly, other considerations also are at work, and indeed we ﬁnd evidence
that is consistent with market timing and signaling as well as with managing earnings. As Myers
(2002) remarks ‘There is no universal theory of capital structure, and no reason to expect one...Each
factor could be dominant for some ﬁrms or in some circumstances, yet unimportant elsewhere.’
The ‘making the numbers’ or MTN hypothesis is motivated by the observation that executive
compensation schemes do not take explicit account of risk, being typically based on share prices,
earnings per share, or return on equity metrics. Other things equal, managers would prefer that
the risk of their ﬁrms be low since much of the manager’s wealth and human capital are tied up in
the ﬁrm. However, to the extent that most compensation contracts have option like features as a
result of limited liability, a manager has an incentive to increase risk through leverage, and to ‘roll
the dice’, when future prospects look relatively poor.2 The MTN hypothesis is consistent with the
survey evidence of Graham and Harvey (2001) that ‘when issuing equity, respondents are concerned
about earnings per share dilution and recent stock price appreciation’.3 It is also consistent with the
evidence reported by Graham et al. (2005) that managers place a very high importance on earnings
rather than on cash ﬂows or other metrics,4 as well as with the evidence of Zeckhauser et al. (1999)
1Welch (2004) writes, ‘corporate issuing motives themselves remain largely a mystery.’
2Matsunaga and Park (2001) ﬁnd that failure to meet analysts consensus estimates results in paycuts for
the CEO.
3They also ﬁnd ‘very little evidence that executives are concerned about asset substitution, asymmetric
information, transactions costs, free cash ﬂows, or personal taxes.
4‘Our results indicate that CFOs believe that earnings, not cash ﬂows, are the key metric considered by
outsiders. The two most important earnings benchmarks are quarterly earnings for the same quarter last
year and the analyst consensus estimate. Meeting or exceeding benchmarks is very important. Managers
2that managers manage earnings to beat analyst expectations.
The MTN hypothesis is also motivated by the suspicion aroused by recent public discussions
about bank capital, that managers of banks do not accept the Modigliani-Miller framework but believe
instead that equity is more expensive than debt, which leads them to rely more on debt ﬁnancing when
the future returns on investments are expected to be low in order to achieve their target earnings per
share and return on equity.5 Indeed, some academics appear to share this view: for example, Mishkin
and Aekin (2009, p. 444) write that that: ‘Banks do not want to hold too much capital because by so
doing they will lower the returns to equity holders.’ Unlike behavioral models of corporate ﬁnance,6
the MTN hypothesis does not presume irrationalityon the part of either investors or managers. Rather
it assumes that managers are rational but that at least a part of managerial compensation depends on
observable accounting variables and that managers rationally take account of this in making decisions.
Turning to empirical ﬁndings, ﬁrms are likely to issue rather than retire debt the more negative
is the future change in underlying proﬁtability, the more over-optimistic are analyst forecasts about
future earnings and the higher is the earnings yield (relative to the cost of debt). These ﬁndings are
consistent with a focus on earnings per share when managers are under pressure to perform because of
analyst over-optimism and declining fundamental proﬁtability. Debt issuance rather than retirement
is also associated with asset growth, a low debt-to-assets ratio, asset risk, past stock returns and the
market-to-book ratio.
The amount of debt ﬁnancing raised for a given asset growth rate provides further evidence in
support of the MTN hypothesis in that high debt issuance ﬁrms tend to be ﬁrms whose managers are
under stress in terms of poor past performance, excessive analyst earnings expectations, and declining
returns on assets; there is also a tendency for such ﬁrms to have appointed a new CEO in the current or
immediate past year. In terms of past performance, ﬁrms that choose high debt ﬁnancing ratios have
lower returns on assets in the current and immediately preceding year; they also have more negative
stock returns over the previous 12 months, and lower market-to-book ratios at the end of the previous
year. External pressure on the managements of these ﬁrms is manifest in excessive analyst earnings
expectations: the analyst earnings forecast errors for such ﬁrms are exceptionally high, so that market
expectations exceed what is achieved, putting pressure on management to ‘make the numbers’.
There is evidence that leverage is being used to oﬀset declining investment opportunities. First,
describe a trade-oﬀ between the short-term need to deliver earnings and the long-term objective of making
value-maximizing investment decisions. Executives believe that hitting earnings benchmarks builds credibility
with the market and helps to maintain or increase their ﬁrms stock price.’ They also report that ‘Second,
managers are interested in meeting or beating earnings benchmarks primarily to inﬂuence stock prices and their
own welfare via career concerns and external reputation, and less so in response to incentives related to debt
covenants, credit ratings, political visibility, and employee bonuses that have traditionally been the’.
5For example the Chairman of Deutsche Bank, Josef Ackerman writes that “Demands for Tier-1 capital
ratio of 20%... could depress ROE to levels that make investment into the banking sector unattractive relative
to other business sectors.” Ackermann (2010)
6For a survey see Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2007).
3high debt issuance is a strong predictor of a future decline in return on assets, holding constant asset
growth rates and the current return on assets. Moreover, debt ﬁnancing is positively associated with
the earnings yield and it is when the earnings yield is high that debt ﬁnancing is most likely to increase
reported earnings per share. There is also some evidence that, faced with declining proﬁtability,
managers not only rely more heavily on debt ﬁnancing, but also undertake more risky investments:
for each asset growth category, there is a U-shaped relation between debt issuance and the risk of
future returns as measured by the cross-sectional standard deviation of return on assets within an
asset growth/debt issuance category of ﬁrms. However, the non-linear relation between debt issuance
and asset risk that we ﬁnd in the portfolio sorts is not signiﬁcant in multiple regressions that include
additional explanatory variables.
For ﬁrms that issue debt, abnormal stock returns in the following year are strongly negatively
related to the amount of debt ﬁnancing; the abnormal returns are positively related to realized changes
in returns on assets and on equity, and negatively related to errors in analyst forecasts of earnings
that are reported during that year. Moreover, as mentioned above, these future changes in returns
on assets and equity are themselves strongly negatively related to the amount of debt ﬁnancing and
(more weakly) positively related to asset growth, while analyst earnings forecast errors are strongly
positively related to debt ﬁnancing and negatively related to asset growth. Thus debt ﬁnancing
forecasts a deterioration in fundamentals that is not fully anticipated by analysts, and when the
deterioration is realized it is associated with negative stock returns.
The evidence for debt retiring ﬁrms is rather diﬀerent from that for debt issuers. First, despite the
fact that debt retirement forecasts negative future stock returns, it forecasts positive future changes in
proﬁtability and, if anything, reduces analyst forecast errors. There is no evidence that the managers
of debt retiring ﬁrms are under pressure to ‘make the numbers’: current and past stock returns
and returns on assets are positively associated with debt retirement and there is no evidence of an
association between analyst over-optimism and debt retirement. Asset risk and prior debt ratios
are positively associated with debt retirement. Most signiﬁcantly, the market-to-book ratio is both
signiﬁcantly positively related to debt retirement and signiﬁcantly negatively related to future stock
returns, which suggests that market timing may be a signiﬁcant factor in debt retirements. For debt
issuers on the other hand, while debt issuance is also related to the market-to-book ratio, the market-
to-book ratio is unrelated to future stock returns, so that there is no evidence of market timing for debt
issuers. Debt retirements are also negatively associated with the ratio of the earnings yield to bond
yields, suggesting that the eﬀects of debt retirement on reported earnings per share are of concern to
debt retiring ﬁrms as they are for debt issuers.
The positive association between debt retirement and future changes in operating proﬁtability is
consistent with debt signaling models.7 We also ﬁnd that a measure of the sensitivity of the CEO’s
7See Brennan and Kraus (1987), Constantinides and Grundy (1989).
4earnings to stock returns is negatively associated with debt issuance and positively associated with
debt retirement. These associations are consistent with managerial risk aversion and the ﬁndings of
Tufano (1996) on corporate risk management. Thus we ﬁnd evidence that is consistent with three
considerations: making the numbers and risk reduction, which are both consistent with managerial
career concerns, and debt signaling.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss some related literature. In
section 3 we describe the data. Section 4 reports on the bivariate relations between asset growth and
future returns and between debt growth and future returns. Section 5 analyzes portfolios constructed
by sorting on both asset growth and debt growth and considers the determinants of the choice between
debt issuance and retirement. Sections 6 and 7 consider the characteristics of debt issuers and retirers
in more detail and section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The making the numbers hypothesis is related to models such as Zwiebel (1996), Morellec (2004) and
Lambrecht and Myers (2008) which recognize the discretionary role of management and focus on the
conﬂict of interest between managers and shareholders. Stulz (1990) also relates corporate capital
structures to managerial incentives.
There is relatively little empirical work relating managerial incentives to corporate ﬁnancing deci-
sions. The early evidence on the relation between managerial ownership and leverage is mixed. Friend
and Lang (1988) and Firth (1995) ﬁnd a negative relation between executive ownership and lever-
age which they attributed to managerial risk aversion. On the other hand, Mehran (1992) reports a
positive relationship between the ﬁrm’s leverage ratio and the percentage of executives’ total compen-
sation in incentive plans, and the percentage of equity owned by managers. Berger et al. (1997) report
that entrenched CEO’s tend to avoid debt and that leverage increases following involuntary CEO re-
placements. However, they also ﬁnd that leverage is positively associated with CEO stock and option
ownership. More recently, Birkeland et al. (2011) report that leverage of Nordic ﬁrms is negatively
related to managerial holdings of both stock and options. However, these studies are plagued with
endogeneity problems and, as Welch (2011) remarks, ‘although the (empirical) literature has uncov-
ered some forces that contribute on the margin to explaining managerial capital structure activity, the
ﬁrst-order managerial motives still remain largely a mystery.’ Jung et al. (1996) show that stock price
reactions to equity issues depend positively on the ﬁrm’s growth opportunities as measured by the
market-to-book ratio; they argue that ﬁrms that issue equity, when they are predicted by a logit model
to issue debt, do so in order to expand managerial discretion to make unproﬁtable investments that
oﬀer private beneﬁts to managers. Although not directly comparable, this is somewhat in contrast to
our ﬁnding that ﬁrms that rely most heavily on debt ﬁnancing have worse future operating proﬁt.
5Our ﬁndings that asset and debt growth predict future stock returns are consistent with the
evidence of Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) and Cooper et al. (2008), as well as with the evidence that
capital raising activities, such as issues of stock or debt, lead to lower future returns, while returns of
capital to investors through share repurchases or debt retirements are associated with higher future
stock returns. Cooper et al. (2008) conﬁrm the robustness of an asset growth eﬀect against a variety of
alternatives and show that, while for all ﬁrms it is debt and equity ﬁnanced asset expansions that are
associated with lower future returns, the results diﬀer according to ﬁrm size: for small ﬁrms the results
mirror those of the full sample, for medium size ﬁrms only debt ﬁnanced investment is signiﬁcantly
associated with lower future returns, and for large ﬁrms only the component of asset expansion that
is ﬁnanced by stock issues is associated with lower future returns.8 Our paper builds on these results
by exploring the motives of managers for choosing particular ﬁnancing mixes for a given asset growth
rate and relating the motives of managers to the abnormal returns that are observed.
Our ﬁnding that debt retirement is related to overpricing of the stock is consistent with the ﬁndings
on market timing by Baker and Wurgler (2002) as well as DeAngelo et al. (2010) who describe market
timing as ‘the most prominent theoretical explanation for SEOs’. Our focus on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing
choices is related to the extensive literature concerning the choice between bond and stock issuance.9
A signiﬁcant diﬀerence between our approach and that of these papers is that we consider all types of
debt ﬁnancing while these papers focus on predicting which ﬁrms will issue bonds and which will issue
stock, and implicitly ignore the possibility that the equity issuer may be simultaneously borrowing
from the bank, and the debt issuer may be repaying bank debt.
This paper is also related to an extensive accounting literature that documents the manipulation
of corporate earnings either through accruals or by changes to real activities. The surveys of Bruns
and Merchant (1990) and Graham et al. (2005) report a greater willingness on the part of managers
to manipulate earnings through real activities than through accruals, even though the latter imposes
real economic costs; and the tendency of ﬁrms to prune R&D expenditure to meet earnings targets
is well attested.10 Interestingly, Liu et al. (2010) provide evidence that ﬁrms manipulate earnings
through discretionary accruals in the year of, and the year prior to, a bond issue.
3 Data
Our main data source is the merged Compustat-CRSP data set. We restrict our analysis to ﬁrms
with ﬁscal year ending in December, starting in 1968, ignoring non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms with SIC codes
8Fama and French (2008) argue that ‘there is no asset growth anomaly in the average returns on the big
stocks that account for more than 90% of total market cap.’ Daniel and Titman (2006) ﬁnd that future returns
are strongly negatively related to growth that is ﬁnanced by stock issuance.
9See for example Baxter and Cragg (1970), Marsh (1982), Jung et al. (1996).
10Baber et al. (1991), Deechow and Sloan (1991), Bushee (1998).
66000 and 6999. To mitigate back-ﬁlling biases we disregard the ﬁrst year’s observation for each ﬁrm.
We combine annual accounting data for the years 1968 to 2010 with stock return data for 1966 to
2011. We match 85,597 out of the 87,803 accounting data observations with stock return data. The
number of sample ﬁrms with both accounting and stock return data ranges from 843 in 1968 to 2,529
in 2009 and averages 2,038. We also use the IBES data on analyst earnings forecasts for 1975 to 2010
and Execcomp data from Compustat from 1992 to 2010 for information about CEO appointments,
compensation and exits.
Our primary variables of interest are:
Total Asset Growth (TAG): The proportionate change in the book value of the ﬁrm’s total assets
during the year.
Debt Growth: The change in the book value of all short and long term debt outstanding (excluding
accounts payable) expressed as a proportion of the book value of the ﬁrm’s assets at the beginning of
the year. (Debt is deﬁned as the sum of Compustat codes dlc and dltt.)11
Return on Assets: Operating income after depreciation (Compustat code: oiadp) divided by the
lagged book value of assets (Compustat code: at).
Return on Equity: Income before extraordinary items (Compustat code: ib) divided by the lagged
book value of equity (Compustat code: ceq).
Market to Book Ratio, M/B: Number of shares (Compustat code: csho) multiplied by end-of-year
share price (Compustat code: prcc f) divided by book value of equity (Compustat code: ceq).
Earnings forecast errors, FE: The scaled median analyst forecast errors for the year. We denote
by FE(y,y+1) the forecast error for year y +1 made in the last quarter of year y; the forecast errors
are scaled by the stock price at the end of the year in which they are made. The median forecast
errors are taken from IBES.
CEO turnover: A dummy variable that is equal to unity if a new CEO is appointed. Data are
taken from Execcomp from 1992 to 2012.
Stock price sensitivity, SENSI: The sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to the stock price is calculated
as the product of the share price and the sum of the number of shares and and one half the number
of unexercised options held by the CEO. These data are from Execcomp for 1992 to 2010.
Baa: The annual average of weekly observations for the year on Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate
Bond Yield.
11Welch (2011) objects to the use of the ratio of ﬁnancial debt to assets as a measure of ﬁrm leverage, but
admits that ‘A universal best measure may not even exist, but might depend on the question being asked.’ Our
deﬁnition is motivated by the ﬁnding that future abnormal stock returns are associated with this measure, and
by the fact that increases in ﬁnancial debt are the result of managerial decisions whereas the behavior of other
components of the liabilities may be beyond direct managerial control in a given year.
74 Asset and Debt Change Portfolios and the Choice be-
tween Debt Issuance and Debt Retirement
We start by examining the characteristics and risk-adjusted returns of portfolios that are sorted
according to both Total Asset Growth (TAG) and debt growth as a proportion of assets. Each year
y, from 1968 to 2010, 10 portfolios are formed ﬁrst on the basis of the ﬁrm’s TAG during the year.
Each of the 10 portfolios formed on the basis of TAG is then subdivided into 9 portfolios on the basis
of their change in debt outstanding during year y expressed as a proportion of the book value at the
beginning of the year; DR1-DR4 are debt retirers, Dzero no change in debt, and DI1-DI4 are the
debt issuers. DR4 and DI4 are the extreme portfolios of ﬁrms that respectively retire and issue the
most debt during the year.
4.1 Portfolio characteristics
Summary statistics based on equally weighted ﬁrm characteristics for the portfolios in the year of
portfolio formation are presented in Table 1. Panel A shows that for the ﬁrst 9 deciles of TAG there
is little relation between asset growth and debt growth. On the other hand in TAG decile 10 the
quartile of the highest debt issuers, DI4, has TAG almost twice as great as the quartile of the highest
debt retirers and almost four times as great as that of more modest debt issuers. The assets of the
ﬁrst 3 TAG deciles actually shrink on average, and it is only in the deciles above the ﬁfth that the
asset growth rate is above 5%.12 The portfolios of the highest TAG decile have average asset growth
rates in year y that range from 86% to 303%. TAG decile 1 has average asset growth rates of -30% to
-39%, implying signiﬁcant asset disposals or write-downs. For TAG decile 2 the average growth rate
is of the order of -10% and for decile 3 of -3%. The remaining deciles have modest but positive growth
rates in the range of 1-9%. Deciles 7, 8 and 9 are high growth deciles with growth rates of around
12%, 18%, and 32% respectively. Decile 10 contains hyper growth ﬁrms in which the average growth
rates range from 75% to 303%.
Panel B shows that debt retirements are modest in most cases except for TAG1 and TAG10
where they reach 35% and 42% of assets respectively. It is striking that the average ﬁrm in the highest
quartile of debt retirers, DR4 in TAG10, actually retires an amount of debt equal to 42% of its assets
while more than doubling its total assets. Debt growth rates are mainly below 10% of assets except
in the highest debt issuance quartile where they range up to 150% in the highest TAG decile.
Not surprisingly, equity growth is increasing in asset growth and decreasing in debt growth (the
zero debt issuers are anomalous): Panel C shows that equity growth is negative in the north and east
extremities of the table: ﬁrms whose assets shrink reduce their equity and the largest debt issuers
12In subsequent tables we leave a space after TAG decile 3 to remind the reader that the ﬁrst three deciles
have negative average asset growth.
8also tend to be reducing the amount of equity on the balance sheet, through losses, dividends or share
repurchases. We note again that the highest debt retirement quartile in TAG decile 10 is exceptional
in that it increases its equity by 172% of assets while increasing its assets by only 157%.
Panel D shows that ﬁrms that neither increase nor decrease their debt outstanding, the Dzero
category, tend to be much smaller than other ﬁrms in their asset growth category. We also note that
debt retiring ﬁrms in the TAG10 category are only about 1/3 the size of debt issuers in the same
growth category: Panel F shows that there tend to be few ﬁrms that are retiring debt while growing
rapidly, and few ﬁrms that issue debt while shrinking their total assets.
4.2 Returns
Deﬁne month 0 as the December of year y, the year in which TAG is measured. Then, for each
portfolio formation year y, equally weighted (EW) and value weighted (VW) portfolios are formed
at the beginning of month 7, July of year y + 1, are held until the end of month 18, and are not
rebalanced during this time window. In this way a time series of portfolio returns is formed for each
portfolio for the time window [7,18].
The Fama-French (1992) three factor model is used to calculate abnormal returns on each of the
portfolios by estimating the following regression:
Rp,τ − RF,τ = αp + βM
p (RM,τ − RF,τ) + βHML
p HMLτ + βSMB
p SMBτ + ￿pτ, (4.1)
where Rp,τ is the return on portfolio p in month τ, RF,τ is the risk-free interest rate in month τ,
RM,τ is the return on the market portfolio, and HMLτ and SMBτ are the returns on the Fama-French
book-to-market and size factors, and αp is the abnormal or risk-adjusted return on portfolio p. The
regression is estimated using the whole sample of window [7,18] returns. By using only returns in the
post-ﬁnancing period we avoid measurement problems due to changes in risk associated with the asset
growth and ﬁnancing.13
Table 2 reports the abnormal returns on the Total Asset Growth and Debt Issuance or Retirement
portfolios for months [7-18]. The most signiﬁcant abnormal returns are for TAG10, the high asset
growth portfolios and, consistent with prior ﬁndings,14 these are negative. There is an inverted U-
shaped pattern between returns and debt ﬁnancing for TAG10: among debt issuers the abnormal
returns are decreasing in debt issuance, for the EW portfolios reaching minus 1% per month for DI4,
and among debt retirers the abnormal returns are also decreasing reaching minus 80 basis points
13There is an extensive theoretical literature arguing that systematic risk will fall following periods of high
investment. See for example Berk, Naik and Green (1999) and Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2004). Cooper
and Priestley (2011) show that systematic risk as measured by the Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) decreases
following high asset growth.
14See for example Titman et al. op.cit. and Cooperet al. op.cit.
9per month for DR4; there is a similar pattern for the VW returns in TAG10. In addition to the
signiﬁcant returns in TAG10, we note also that there are strong abnormal return eﬀects associated
with debt growth. Thus only three (one) out of ten of the returns in DI4 are positive for the VW
(EW) portfolios, while only two out of ten of the returns in DI1 are negative (and three of them
are positive and signiﬁcant) for the EW portfolios; and for the VW portfolios the only return in DI1
that is negative is in TAG10. High debt issuance tends to associated with negative returns while ﬁrst
quartile debt issuance tends to be associated with positive returns except in the highest asset growth
deciles.
Among the debt retirers almost all the abnormal returns are positive for the ﬁrst 8 TAG deciles
and many of these are highly signiﬁcant for the EW portfolios: debt retirement appears to be a strong
signal of future good performance. While this is consistent with debt signalling models, the delayed
price reaction seems inconsistent with the market grasping the implicationsof these corporate decisions
in a timely fashion. In contrast to the generally positive returns on debt retirers, we ﬁnd that in the
highest asset growth deciles, TAG9 and TAG10, the abnormal returns on the quartile of highest debt
retirers, DR4, are around minus 90 basis points per month and strongly signiﬁcant, while the returns
on the lower debt issuance quartiles (and Dzero) of these TAG deciles are small and insigniﬁcant.
The return patterns that we have described for months [7-18] continue in an attenuated form for
months [19-30] (not reported): for the EW portfolios all but two of the TAG2-TAG8 portfolios that
retire debt in year y have positive abnormal returns, all but two of the high debt issuance portfolios in
DI4 continue to have negative returns, and in TAG10 there are signiﬁcant negative abnormal returns
for the debt issuing portfolios, reaching minus 50 basis points per month for the high debt issuance
portfolio.
The general pattern of post-announcement returns can be summarized as follows: abnormal returns
for months [7-18] tend to be positive for debt retirers and negative for debt issuers, and abnormal
returns tend to be negative for the highest one or two asset growth deciles. In the highest asset
growth decile there is an inverted U-shaped relation between abnormal returns and debt issuance, due
primarily to the strongly signiﬁcant negative returns on the debt retiring portfolio, DR4 (which is
also reﬂected in DR4 of TAG9). The pattern carries over to months [19-30] in attenuated form and
with reduced statistical signiﬁcance.
4.3 The Choice between Debt Issuance and Retirement
Table 3 reports the results of panel logit regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy
variable that is equal to unity if a ﬁrm issues debt in year y and zero if it reduces debt: we ignore
the Dzero ﬁrms. In all the regressions the probability of debt issuance is positively related to asset
growth, TAGy. The coeﬃcient of the prior year’s debt ratio, D/Ay−1, is negative in most of the
regressions but is not highly signiﬁcant and is even signiﬁcantly positive in regression (v) which omits
10the analyst forecast error and therefore has a large number of observations. Consistent with the idea
that low past returns put more pressure on managers to make the numbers, the coeﬃcient of the
lagged stock return, Rety−1, is negative in all the regressions and highly signiﬁcant in those that do
not include the forecast error, FE(y − 1,y + 1), and so have a larger number of observations. This
negative coeﬃcient, as well as the generally negative coeﬃcient of the lagged market to book ratio, is
also consistent with a market timing interpretation:15 we shall see below that there is some evidence
of market timing among debt retirers but not among debt issuers for which greater debt issuance
forecasts lower future returns which implies more current over-valuation of the stock. SDROAy+1 is
a measure of asset risk. It is calculated each year, y, as the cross-sectional standard deviation within
the asset growth/debt growth portfolio to which the ﬁrm belongs of the change in Return on Assets
between year y and year y + 1. Although this is undoubtedly an imperfect measure of the risk of an
individual ﬁrm, we ﬁnd that it is a strong negative predictor of debt issuance: high risk ﬁrms tend
to reduce rather than increase their debt. This is consistent with theories of capital structure that
rely on costs of bankruptcy or ﬁnancial distress. It is also consistent with managerial concerns over
security of tenure.
More directly related to the MTN hypothesis that managers attempt to compensate for declining
proﬁtability by issuing debt is the variable ∆ROAy+1, the change in Return on Assets between year
y and the subsequent year. The strong signiﬁcance of this variable suggests that managers have
some knowledge of changes in future proﬁtability at the time they make the debt issuance/retirement
decision, and issue debt when the prospects of future proﬁtability are less favorable.16 The sign of
the coeﬃcient is at odds with bankruptcy cost/ﬁnancial distress stories which predict that managers
will reduce leverage rather than increase it when proﬁtability is expected to decline. It is also at odds
with market timing stories in which managers might be expected to issue more overpriced equity when
they have private information about declining prospects, but it is consistent with the MTN hypothesis
that managers issue debt in order to help them increase earnings per share in the face of declining
proﬁtability.
FE(y−1,y+1) is the error in the consensus forecast of year y+1 earnings per share made in the
last quarter of year y−1, scaled by the share price at the end of year y−1. We interpret this variable
as a measure of the pressure on management to meet the numbers that is created by over-optimism
on the part of analysts. The signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient on the variable in regressions (i) and (iii) is
consistent with this interpretation. To some extent this variable is a substitute for ∆ROAy+1, which
15See Baker and Wurgler (2002).
16It is possible that the decline in ROA occurs because earnings in years y and y − 1 are overstated as the
result of accruals manipulation as described by Liu et al. (2010): to the extent that this is the case, it is
evidence that managers are trying to ‘make the numbers’ in these earlier years also. Liu et al also ﬁnd evidence
of accrual manipulations in year y+1 for small ﬁrm issuers and for the issuers of below investment grade bonds.
Earnings management through accruals in year y + 1 is consistent with our story of earnings management
through ﬁnancing choices.
11also represents pressure on management and also depends on the year y + 1 earnings realization, and
we see that when FE(y − 1,y + 1) is omitted in regressions (ii) and (v) the signiﬁcance and size of
the coeﬃcient of ∆ROAy+1 increases. Conversely, the coeﬃcient of FE(y − 1,y + 1) becomes larger
and more signiﬁcant when ∆ROAy+1 is omitted from regression (iii).
We have suggested that the incentive to issue debt to make the numbers exists when the earnings
yield is above the cost of debt. We attempt to capture this eﬀect in two ways. First, we include
the earnings yield at the end of the previous year, (E/P)y−1, in the regression, and add annual
dummy variables to capture the time-variation in the cost of debt. Consistent with our hypothesis,
the coeﬃcient of (E/P)y−1 is positive and signiﬁcant in regression (iv). Secondly, we include in the
regression the ratio of the earnings yield to the average for the previous year of the weekly Moody’s
Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield, ((E/P)/Baa)y−1. The coeﬃcient of this variable in regressions
(v) and (vi) is positive but not signiﬁcant. As we shall see below, this variable is much more signiﬁcant
in explaining the amount of debt that is issued or retired by ﬁrms.
The dummy variable, CEOstarty−1,y is equal to one if a new CEO was appointed in year y or
y − 1; while the coeﬃcient of the variable is positive, it is not signiﬁcant. On the other hand, the
coeﬃcient of SENSIy, which captures the sensitivity of CEO pay to the stock price, is negative and
signiﬁcant: CEOs who are more exposed to stock price risk are more inclined to retire debt rather to
issue it. This is consistent with the ﬁnding of Berger et al. (1997) that the entrenched managers tend
to have lower leverage.
In what follows we shall analyze the properties of debt issuers and retirers separately.
5 Debt Issuers
The return anomalies associated with asset and debt growth that are shown in Table 2 raise two
issues: why there are negative returns associated with asset and debt growth, and why these returns
are delayed. We shall explore these issues by examining ﬁrst the relations between the future abnormal
returns of ﬁrms and their asset and debt growth characteristics, as well as their analyst forecast errors
and market-to-book ratios . Then we shall establish the relation between asset growth and debt
ﬁnancing and future changes in proﬁtability and analyst earnings forecast errors. Finally, we shall
consider the determinants of the amount of debt that is used to ﬁnance asset growth.
5.1 Stock Returns, Changes in Fundamentals, and Forecast Errors
Table 2 shows that the abnormal return in months [7,18] on the high debt issuance quartile, DI4, is less
than or equal to that of the the low debt issuance quartile, DI1, for virtually every TAG decile: the
diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 5% (10%) level for the EW (VW) high asset growth (TAG10) portfolios
and is also signiﬁcant for several other TAG deciles of EW portfolios. The average diﬀerence between
12the returns on the DI4 and DI1 quartiles across TAG deciles is minus 28 and 43 basis points per
month or about 3.5% and 5% per annum for the VV and EW portfolios respectively.
The importance of debt issuance relative to asset growth for future abnormal returns is substan-
tiated by regression analysis. The ﬁrst two columns of Table 4 report the results of panel regressions
of the abnormal returns for months 7-18 for the 40 debt issuance portfolios on the logarithms of asset
growth and debt issuance.17 In column (i) the ﬁrst variable is the log of the simple asset growth rate
and portfolios with negative average growth rates are omitted; in column (ii) all portfolios are included
and the ﬁrst variable is ln(1 + TAG). The results are striking. The coeﬃcients of both asset growth
and debt issuance variables are negative, but only the coeﬃcients of debt issuance are statistically
signiﬁcant, and this is despite the fact that the portfolios were formed by sorting ﬁrst on asset growth
and then on debt growth. Regression (i) provides the higher explanatory power and, as one would
expect, the results are more highly signiﬁcant for the equally weighted portfolios shown in Panel B,
where the t − statistic on ln(DI) is close to ﬁve for regression (i) which explains 7% of the abnormal
returns.
To assess whether the abnormal returns in months [7-18] that constitute the debt issuance anomaly
are related to news about fundamentals that is released during this time period, the abnormal returns
on the 40 portfolios are regressed on the average changes in Return on Assets and Return on Equity
of the ﬁrms in the portfolios between years y and y + 1 (∆ROAy+1,∆ROEy+1), as well as on the
average scaled error in the median analyst forecast of earnings per share for year y + 1 that is made
in the last quarter of year y, FE(y,y + 1). The scaling is by the stock price at the end of the year.18
Note that all three variables become known during months [7-18].
The results of panel regressions are reported in columns (iii)-(vi) of Table 4. First, we note that
the regression results are stronger for the EW portfolios than for the VW portfolios. Secondly, we note
that the abnormal return is signiﬁcantly associated with the change in Return on Equity for both VW
and EW portfolios, and that for the EW portfolios the change in ROE has a much stronger eﬀect on
abnormal returns than the change in ROA: the t − statistic of the former is less than three while on
the latter it is in excess of six; when the changes in ROA and ROE are both included in the regression,
for the VW portfolios neither variable remains signiﬁcant, but for the EW portfolios only the change
in ROE is signiﬁcant. Thus it appears that, at least for the smaller ﬁrms that dominate the EW
regressions, investors are more concerned about the change in fundamentals that is represented in the
Return on Equity than they are about the change in Return on Assets. This is surprising since the
change in Return on Equity is the resultant of both the change in Return on Assets and the change in
leverage: changes in the Return on Equity that are the product of changes in leverage are apparently
17We use the abnormal returns of the portfolios, rather than computing abnormal returns of individual ﬁrms
because of the diﬃculties of arising from changing betas for ﬁrms with strong asset asset growth and changing
capital structures. See footnote 13.
18See Christie (1987).
13not discounted by investors. This is at odds with the predictions of the Modigliani-Miller theorem,
but is consistent both with the ‘bankers’ view’ that what is important to investors is the Return on
Equity, and with the belief of CFOs reported by Graham et al. (2005)19 that earnings are the key
metric considered by investors.
In column (v) the independent variable is the (average for the portfolio of the) median forecast
error for year y + 1 earnings per share for forecasts made in the last quarter of year y scaled by the
share price at the end of year y. Despite the shorter sample period necessitated by the availability
of earnings forecast data, for both equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios the abnormal returns
are negatively and signiﬁcantly associated with the forecast errors.
The regressions in columns (vi) and (vii) include the market-to-book ratio at the end of year y,
(M/B)y. There is no evidence that ﬁrms with higher market-to-book ratios have lower future returns.
Thus there is no evidence that ﬁrms choose to ﬁnance more with debt when their stock is underpriced
as market timing theories would suggest.
Thus, it seems that the signiﬁcant future abnormal returns for debt issuers that we observe in
Table 1 and the regressions reported in columns (i) and (ii) of Table 4 can be attributed, at least in
part, to the failure of the market to make unbiased forecasts of future changes in ROA, ROE and
earnings per share. Moreover, the fact that the abnormal returns on the portfolios are negatively
associated with debt issuance, positively associated with changes in returns on assets and on equity,
and negatively associated with errors in forecast earnings per share, suggests that debt issuance itself
may be systematically associated with future changes in returns on assets and on equity and with
forecast errors. In order to explore this, we regress these variables on debt issuance and asset growth
using individual security data since there is no advantage to the use of portfoliodata when risk-adjusted
stock returns are not included in the regression analysis.
5.2 Changes in Fundamentals, Forecast Errors, and Growth and
Financing Decisions
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 5 report the results of panel regressions of future changes in ROA
and ROE on the levels of these variables and the logarithms of asset growth and debt issuance for
individual securities. ROA and ROE are winsorized at the 1% level. The sample includes all ﬁrms
with positive debt issuance in year y (DIy > 0) from 1968 to 2010, and there are over 33,000 ﬁrm year
observations.
First, there is strong evidence of global mean reversion in both variables: the coeﬃcient of the
lagged variables being greater than 0.5 in absolute value and highly signiﬁcant in both regressions.
The asset growth variable, ln(1+TAGy), is positively and signiﬁcantly associated with future changes
in ROE and ROA and, more signiﬁcantly, the debt issuance variable, ln(DIy), is a strong predictor of
19See footnote 4.
14changes in both ROA and ROE: higher debt growth predicts lower returns on both assets and equity.
The t-statistic for the ROA equation is in excess of 13 and for the ROE equation is approximately 3.
Thus we have found an explanation for the link between debt growth and future abnormal returns:
debt growth predicts changes in proﬁt fundamentals which are not anticipated by the market. In
particular, high debt growth predicts lower future returns on assets and equity and, as we have seen
in Table 4, when these lower accounting returns are realized, stock prices fall. Note that the negative
association that we have documented between debt issuance and future stock and accounting returns
is inconsistent with market timing: more debt is issued when stock prices are too high and managers
expect proﬁtability to decline.
Further evidence of the link between unanticipated changes in fundamentals and asset growth and
debt issuance is provided in columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 5 which report the results of regressions of
errors in consensus analyst forecast earnings per share on asset growth and debt issuance. FE(y,y+1)
is the forecast error of earnings per share for year y + 1 made in the last quarter of year y scaled by
the share price at the end of year y - the ‘one year ahead’ forecast error. Similarly, FE(y − 1,y + 1)
is the forecast error of earnings per share for year y + 1 made in the last quarter of year y − 1 scaled
by the share price at the end of year y −1 - the ‘two year ahead’ forecast error. We see that both one
and two year ahead forecast errors for year y+1 earnings are strongly positively associated with debt
issuance; the eﬀect is approximately twice as strong for the one year ahead error. Analysts are more
over-optimistic about ﬁrms that ﬁnance more with debt so that these ﬁrms have bigger forecast errors.
This over-optimism about high debt issuers, as well as the negative future stock returns associated
with debt ﬁnancing shown in Table 4, provides further evidence against the market timing hypothesis
for debt issuers, since the stocks of high debt issuers are, if anything, over-priced. On the other
hand, the coeﬃcients of the asset growth variable are both negative and highly signiﬁcant: higher
asset growth is associated with lower forecast errors. Thus the forecast errors that are associated with
negative abnormal returns are driven, not so much by asset growth itself, but by the associated debt
growth when the asset expansion is ﬁnanced by debt.20
It is not altogether surprising that asset growth should be associated with higher returns on equity
since presumably the asset growth is partly the result of good fundamentals in the future. But why
should debt ﬁnancing herald lower future returns? Our explanation is that, if debt ﬁnancing is a tool
that helps managers to ‘make the numbers’, then we should expect that ﬁrms that use the most debt,
ceteris paribus, are those that are under the most pressure to make the numbers, and these will include
ﬁrms whose future earnings prospects are poor. This will lead to an association between debt issuance
and subsequent declines in fundamentals, which is what we observe.
Table 6 reports some other measures of pressure on the managers of debt issuers to perform better.
20Cooper et al. (2008) report that for medium size ﬁrms only debt ﬁnanced investment is signiﬁcantly
associated with lower future returns, while for large ﬁrms only equity ﬁnanced investment is associated with
lower returns.
15Comparing the high debt issuers in DI4 with the low debt issuers in DI1 we see in Panels A and B
that for virtually every asset growth decile the high debt issuers have signiﬁcantly lower returns on
both assets and equity in year y − 1: this is consistent with cross section studies which typically ﬁnd
that the most proﬁtable ﬁrms tend to borrow least.21
Panel C shows that the market-to-book (M/B) ratio at the end of year y − 1 is almost always
lower for DI4 than for DI1. This is consistent with the ﬁnding of Fama and French (2012) that equity
issuance is positively related to the price-to-book ratio but that the variation in the mix of new debt
and equity in response to this variable is ‘typically modest’.22 For TAG decile 10 a shallow ‘U-shaped’
relation between M/B and Debt Issuance quartile emerges. For the VW (EW) TAG10 portfolios the
M/B ratio for DI4 is 4.03 (3.04) as compared with an average ratio for the two middle debt issuance
quartiles of around 3.7 (2.7).
Panel D shows that ﬁrms that increase their debt the most in year y already tend to have the
highest debt ratios in year y − 1: in the three highest TAG deciles the leverage ratio for DI4 in year
y − 1 is around 30% as compared with less than 20% for DI1. This simple comparison reveals no
evidence of mean reversion in debt ratios. However, we make no attempt to take account of diﬀerent
target leverage ratios for diﬀerent ﬁrms. Previous authors who do take account of diﬀerent target
leverage ratios do ﬁnd evidence of mean reversion using a regression approach but, as Fama and
French (2012) point out, ‘leverage targets are not generally a ﬁrst order consideration in ﬁnancing
decisions’, and in the regressions that we report below we shall ﬁnd evidence of mean reversion once
we account for other factors.23 For positive growth ﬁrms, the debt ratio in year y − 1 is a decreasing
function of the TAG decile which is consistent with debt overhang theories of capital structure.24
Most importantly, as seen in Panel E, the managers of the high debt issuers face the problem
that at the end of year y − 1 analysts are over-estimating their earnings per share for year y + 1 by
much more than they are over-estimating the earnings of the low debt issuers. For every TAG decile
the forecast errors are higher for DI4 than for DI1: on average by 5.3% (7.1%) for the VW (EW)
portfolios; this diﬀerence is a multiple of the scaled forecast for the DI1 ﬁrms. Thus, to the extent
that managers are under pressure to ‘make the numbers’ expected by analysts,25 the managers of the
ﬁrms that issue the most debt are under the most pressure.
Further evidence that the managers of ﬁrms in the high debt issuance quartile may be under
21Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wald (1999), Booth et al. (2001).
22Myers (2002) reports that there is a ‘strong inverse relation between the market-to-book ratio and debt
ratios’. This may be because highly proﬁtable ﬁrms often use their earnings to pay down debt.
23Only 19% of the ﬁrms in the Graham and Harvey (2001) survey said they did not have a target debt ratio
or target range.
24Myers (1977).
25That managers are under such pressure is suggested by the extensive literature on earnings management,
and the tendency for reported earnings per share to cluster just above the consensus estimate. (DeGeorge et al.
(1999)). Graham et al. (2005) report that managers are willing to take costly real actions in order to achieve
earnings targets based on analyst consensus estimates.
16pressure to perform is apparent in the average monthly abnormal returns for year y − 1 shown in
Panel F. Consistent with previous studies, we ﬁnd that asset growth is positively associated with past
returns. More signiﬁcantly, for virtually every TAG decile the abnormal returns on the high debt
issuance quartile are below those of the low debt issuance quartile. For TAG10 the diﬀerence is 70
(80) basis points per month or 8.4% (9.6%) per year for the VW (EW) portfolios. This diﬀerence could
also be interpreted in terms of the market timing hypothesis: ﬁrms tend to rely on equity issuance
after their stock price has risen.26 But against this hypothesis is the lack of evidence in Table 2 of
signiﬁcant positive abnormal returns for the low debt issuance portfolios in months [7,18] following
the ﬁnancing year.27
Panel A of Table 7 shows for each asset growth/debt issuance category the proportion of ﬁrms
that appoint a new CEO in either year y of year y − 1. For all but the lowest TAG decile the high
debt issuers are more likely to have appointed a new CEO than the low debt issuers, and for most of
the deciles they are more than twice as likely. To the extent that new CEO’s are under pressure to
prove themselves by ‘making the numbers’, this is further evidence in favor of the MTN hypothesis.
5.3 Determinants of Debt Financing
Table 8 reports the results of panel regressions using individual ﬁrm data to predict DIy, the growth in
debt as a proportion of assets. In the regressions that include the earnings yield we include only ﬁrm-
years for which the lagged earnings variable is positive. We include as regressors variables that capture
the current debt ratio, the asset growth to be ﬁnanced, proﬁtability, and current and lagged stock
returns. We also include variables that capture the pressure on management to ‘make the numbers’,
as well as an earnings-price related variable which captures the ability of managers to ‘improve the
numbers’ by debt ﬁnancing. Regression (i) includes only the ﬁrst set of variables and explains 58% of
the variation in normalized debt growth. The lagged debt ratio, D/Ay−1, is strongly and signiﬁcantly
negatively associated with debt issuance in all of the regressions, implying an element of global mean
reversion in debt ratios. The product of the lagged debt ratio and the asset growthrate, D/Ay−1TAGy,
is the debt growth that would arise from asset growth if the debt to asset ratio remained constant; the
positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on this variable in all of the regressions implies a degree of inertia in
debt ratios. However, the positive and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on TAGy implies that higher asset
growth implies proportionately higher reliance on debt ﬁnancing. The negative coeﬃcient on ROAy
implies that ceteris paribus 16-26% of the pre-tax return on assets is available to ﬁnance asset growth.
The change in Return on Assets from year y − 1 to year y, ∆ROAy, is negatively associated with the
amount of debt ﬁnancing in regressions (vi)-(viii). Since we have already accounted for the eﬀect of
26See Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001).
27During the announcement period, months [1,6], ﬁrms in the low debt issuance quartile, DI1 have higher
returns than ﬁrms in the high debt issuance quartile, DI4, for virtually every TAG decile. These results are
not reported here.
17current proﬁtability, ROAy, the inﬂuence of this variable cannot be through the ﬁnancing channel: we
shall discuss it further below. Stock returns in the current and previous year, Rety and Rety−1, are
signiﬁcantly negatively associated with debt issuance. However, the eﬀect is quantitatively modest: a
50% stock return spread over these two years would decrease debt ﬁnancing by only 0.5% of assets in
year y.
Operating risk, as measured by the standard deviation of the change in Return on Assets between
years y and y+1 for all ﬁrms within the same asset growth/debt growth portfolio, SDROAy+1, has a
highly signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on debt issuance. This is consistent with bankruptcy cost and costly
ﬁnancial distress considerations, as well as with risk aversion on the part of managers.
Our most signiﬁcant ﬁndings relate to the variables that capture pressure on management to ‘make
the numbers’, and their ability to do so by issuing debt. Not only is the change in Return on Assets
from the previous year, ∆ROAy, negatively and signiﬁcantly associated with debt ﬁnancing as we have
observed, but regressions (ii) and (iii) show that debt issuance is strongly negatively related to the
future change in Return on Assets, ∆ROAy+1 also. This can only be because management, in making
itsﬁnancing decision in year y, takesinto account itsknowledge of changes in proﬁtabilityin the current
and following year. We conclude that managers faced with declining current and future proﬁtability
tend to rely more heavily on debt ﬁnancing in order to ‘make the numbers’ by using leverage to mask
the eﬀects of the unproﬁtable investments on the ﬁrm’s return on equity. Despite this, as we saw in
Table 5, higher debt issuance is associated with lower increases in the Return on Equity (but even
smaller increases in the Return on Assets). That is, the increased leverage is insuﬃcient on balance to
oﬀset the negative eﬀects of the relatively unproﬁtable investment. Regression (iv) shows a marginally
signiﬁcant relation between debt issuance and analyst forecast errors for year y + 1 earnings made at
the end of year y. This is consistent with the decline in proﬁtability associated with debt issuance
being only partially known by the market.
Regression (v) shows that the greater is the ﬁrm’s under-performance relative to expectations in
year y, as measured by the scaled earnings forecast error for year y, FE(y − 1,y), the more inclined
management is to rely on debt; note that this is after taking account of the stock return in year y.
Managers of ﬁrms that are under-performing relative to analyst expectations are more likely to feel
pressure to ‘make the numbers’ and relying on debt ﬁnancing is one way to accomplish this.
As previously noted, debt ﬁnancing will only lead to an increase in earnings per share if the
earnings yield is above the cost of debt. We include the lagged ratio of the earnings yield to the cost
of debt as measured by the average of the weekly yields during the year on Moody’s Seasoned Baa
Corporate Bond Yield Index, ((E/P)/Baa)y−1, in regression (vi) to capture this eﬀect. Consistent
with the facilitating eﬀect of a high earnings yield for debt ﬁnancing to be eﬃcacious in making the
numbers, the coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant. Similarly, when we include simply the lagged
earnings yield, (E/P)y−1, along with dummy variables for each year to capture time variation in the
18cost of debt ﬁnance, the coeﬃcient of the earnings yield variable is positive and highly signiﬁcant.
Finally, the coeﬃcient of the dummy variable that captures new CEO appointments is positive but
not signiﬁcant, while SENSIy, the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation to the stock price is
signiﬁcantly negatively associated with debt ﬁnancing.
Thus at least a partial explanation can be oﬀered for the delayed price reaction to debt growth. It
is precisely managements that have experienced poor performance and have private information about
poor future prospects who have the most incentive to attempt to disguise the decline in fundamental
proﬁtability by relying heavily on debt ﬁnancing to improve the reported earnings ﬁgures. This
deteriorationin fundamentals can only be disguised for so long and when it becomes public information
it results in negative abnormal returns in months [7,18] and months [19,30]. Of course this account
does not explain why investors do not recognize the cue implicit in a high level of debt ﬁnancing.
Table 9 reports the standard deviation of the change in the Return on Assets from year y to year
y+1 within each debt issuance quartile for each TAG decile. If this variable captures asset risk and if
debt issuance is negatively associated with asset risk, then we should expect that for each asset growth
category the standard deviation would decrease monotonically as we move from DI1 to DI4. We do
ﬁnd that such a monotonic relation tends to hold for the ﬁrst three debt issuance categories, at least
for the positive asset growth deciles, TAG4-TAG10, and that the relation becomes more pronounced
as we move to higher TAG deciles. However, the high debt issuance DI4 quartile is anomalous in
that its standard deviation is higher than that of DI1 for all but one debt issuance category. Closer
examination reveals a U-shaped relation between this measure of asset risk and debt issuance: the
asset risk of both the low debt issuance category, DI1, and of the high debt issuance DI4, is higher
than that of the intermediate debt issuance categories.28 This U-shaped relation is inconsistent with
low risk ﬁrms choosing higher leverage, but it is consistent either with a scenario in which managers
who face a more uncertain future choose a high debt ﬁnancing ratio in the hope that leverage will
oﬀset low returns on assets, or with a scenario in which managers who are faced with poor investment
prospects ‘roll the dice’ both by making risky investments and by ﬁnancing those investments with
leverage. Some evidence that managers of high debt issuance ﬁrms may indeed be ‘rolling the dice’
is given in Panel B of Table 7 which shows that for all but two TAG deciles, the CEO’s of DI4 are
more likely to be replaced in years (y + 1) − (y + 3) than are the CEO’s of DI1 ﬁrms.
28We note that when we included (the orthogonal component of) the squared risk variable in the regressions
in Table 9 the coeﬃcient was not signiﬁcant.
196 Debt Retirers
6.1 Stock Returns, Changes in Fundamentals, and Forecast Errors
Table 2 shows that statistically signiﬁcant abnormal returns for months [7-18] among debt retirers are
much more prevalent among the EW portfoliosthan among the VW portfolios, which is consistent with
large ﬁrms being more eﬃciently priced than small ones. The abnormal returns are predominantly
positive in TAG deciles 1-8, and for the EW portfolios the more statistically signiﬁcant positive
returns tend to be in low debt retirement quartiles DR1-DR3, so that moderate debt retirement
among moderately growing or shrinking ﬁrms is associated with positive returns. The signiﬁcant
positive returns on these portfolios are consistent with the role of debt retirement as a signal of good
news, but it is a signal that, at least for the EW portfolios seems not to be immeidately incorporated
into prices. However, more debt retirement does not seem to be a better signal: in virtually every
TAG decile for both EW and VW portfolios, the abnormal returns for DR4 are below those for DR1.
Negative returns are concentrated in TAG deciles 9 and 10, and particularly in the high debt
retirement quartile of these deciles which have signiﬁcant negative returns of 80-90 basis points per
month. We note that there is an average of only 11 and 9 ﬁrms in these portfolios. Moreover, we
see from Table 1 that the ﬁrms in these deciles, and particularly those in the high debt issuance
quartiles, are small. In what follows we shall investigate the sensitivity of our results to excluding
these portfolios.
Regression (i) in Panels A and B of Table 10 shows that, although debt retirers have predominantly
positive abnormal returns, the abnormal returns on portfolios formed on asset growth and debt retire-
ment are signiﬁcantly negatively related to the levels of both asset growth and debt retirement. The
negative coeﬃcient on debt retirement is particularly striking, since in Table 4 we found a negative
coeﬃcient for debt issuance which was attributed to its role in forecasting negative changes in ROA.
However, these results are very sensitive to the inclusion of the high asset growth deciles. When TAG
decile 10 is removed from the regression the coeﬃcients on asset growth and debt retirement remain
signiﬁcant only for the EW portfolios as seen in Panels C and D. And when both decile 9 and decile
10 are removed neither coeﬃcient remains signiﬁcant for either VW or EW portfolios.
The coeﬃcients of the regressions relating the abnormal returns to changes in ROA and ROE and
the scaled forecast error are reported in columns (ii)-(iv). The parameter estimates are very similar to
those that we found for debt issuers in Table 4. When the changes in both ROA and ROE are included
in regression (v) only the change in ROA is signiﬁcant for the VW portfolios although both variables
are signiﬁcant for the EW portfolios. However, for the EW portfolios this result is sensitive to the
inclusion of TAG10; when these portfolios are excluded from the regression only the change in ROE is
signiﬁcant, which is consistent with the ‘banker’s’ view that investors are only concerned with equity
earnings. There is also evidence in regression (iv) of a negative association between forecast errors
20and the abnormal returns for debt retirers, but this is signiﬁcant only when the TAG10 portfolios are
included in the regression.
Regressions (vi) in Panels A and B show a signiﬁcant negative relation between the market-to-book
ratio, (M/B)y, and the abnormal returns, and this is particularly strong for the EW portfolios. This
is in contrast to the results for debt issuers shown in Table 4 where the market-to-book ratio has no
predictive power for returns. However, the signiﬁcance of the market-to-book ratio disappears for the
VW portfolios and is attenuated for the EW portfolios when the two highest asset growth deciles of
ﬁrms are removed from the regression as seen in Panels C and D. Nevertheless, the signiﬁcance of this
variable suggests that debt retirement, particularly among the high TAG decile portfolios, may be
driven at least in part by market timing and overpricing considerations.
6.2 Changes in Fundamentals, Forecast Errors, and Growth and
and Financing Decisions
We have argued that debt issuance is a negative predictor of stock returns because it is associated
with lower changes in future Returns on Assets (and Equity). However, while debt retirement is also
negatively associated with future stock returns, the ﬁrst two columns of Table 11 show that it is
strongly positively associated with changes in future Returns on Assets and Equity, consistent with
models of debt retirement as a signal of improved future prospects; this association remains signiﬁcant
when TAG decile 10 (and 9) is excluded from the regression. Moreover, for debt retirers, unlike debt
issuers, asset growth is also strongly positively associated with changes in proﬁtability.
Columns (iii) and (iv) of Panels B and C of Table 11 show that earnings forecast errors are
signiﬁcantly negatively related to debt retirement after taking account of asset growth when ﬁrms in
the TAG decile 10 portfoliosare excluded: this is likely to be because debt retirement is associatedwith
improved operating performance. The improved operating performance and reduced forecast errors
associated with debt retirement pose the question of why the level of debt retirement is negatively
related to abnormal returns as seen in Table 10. It does not appear that the association of debt
retirement with negative abnormal stock returns is due to an association with disappointed earnings
expectations as was the case with debt issuance.
When we look at the characteristics of the diﬀerent quartiles of ﬁrms that retire debt we ﬁnd in
Panels A and B of Table 12 that, at least for the top 5 TAG deciles, ﬁrms that retire more debt
are generally less proﬁtable in year y − 1 as measured either by ROA or ROE. Panel C shows that
for most TAG deciles there is a U-shaped relation between debt retirement and the market-to-book
ratio at the end of year y − 1. Panel D shows that for all TAG deciles there is a monotonic relation
between debt retirement and the debt ratio at the end of year y −1: higher debt ratios are associated
with more retirement. There is no clear relation between either earnings forecast errors or abnormal
returns in the previous year to debt retirement. Panel A of Table 13 reveals no clear relation between
21debt issuance and new CEO appointments in years y or y − 1.
6.3 Determinants of Debt Retirement
Table 14, which is similar to Table 8, relates debt retirement for individual ﬁrms to several diﬀerent
ﬁrm characteristics. Debt retirement is strongly positively related to the lagged debt to assets ratio,
to stock returns in years y and y−1,29 to current proﬁtability, ROAy, and to asset risk, SDROAy+1.
The relation to asset growth, TAGy, is negative, but it is not signiﬁcant in the regressions with the
largest numbers of observations. Debt retirement is strongly positively related to the market-to-book
ratio, (M/B)y−1 and to future changes in proﬁtability, ∆ROAy+1. This is consistent with the role of
debt retirement as a signal of improving proﬁtability and, as we saw in Table 11, debt retirement is
a strong predictor of future changes in proﬁtability. On the other hand, there is no relation between
debt retirement and analyst forecast errors, in contrast to the signiﬁcant relation for debt issuance.
The other major determinant of debt retirements is asset risk as measured by SDROAy+1: man-
agers of risky ﬁrms are more inclined to reduce their ﬁnancial leverage. This may be due to concerns
about costs of bankruptcy and ﬁnancial distress as well as to the risk of termination, since the combina-
tion of high asset risk and high leverage provides a powerful incentive for managers who are concerned
with job security to reduce their risk by reducing ﬁnancial leverage through debt retirement. Table 13
shows that among high asset growth ﬁrms CEO turnover in years y+1 to y+3 is considerably higher
in the high debt retirement quartile than in the low retirement quartile, and Table 15 shows that in
all but one TAG decile the asset risk is higher among ﬁrms in the high debt retirement quartile than
in the low retirement quartile. The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on SENSIy, which measures
the relative exposure of their compensation to changes in the stock price, provides further evidence
that managers are concerned about the risk of their compensation.
Table 14 oﬀers no evidence that the managers of debt retirers are under pressure to make the
numbers: past market and accounting returns are positively associated with retirements, as is future
expected proﬁtability and the market-to-book ratio. There is no evidence of an association with
analyst earnings forecast errors. On the other hand, the negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on the
two earnings yield variables in regressions (vi) and (vii) suggest that managers of debt retirers do
take account of the eﬀect of their decisions on reported earnings. The new CEO dummy variable is
insigniﬁcant, and the coeﬃcient of SENSIy is positive and signiﬁcant, consistent with managerial risk
aversion.
How then do we account for the pattern of abnormal returns for debt retirers that we observe in
Table 2? Part of the answer seems to lie in columns (vi) and (vii) in Panel A of Table 10: when TAG
decile 10 ﬁrms are included in the regression, we see that abnormal returns are signiﬁcantly related to
the market-to-book ratio at the end of year y, M/By. This variable has a negative coeﬃcient in the
29Rety is likely to be aﬀected by the positive information content of the debt retirement.
22univariate regressions (vi) for both EW and VW portfolios: for the EW portfolios the t − statistic is
in excess of four, and the variable remains signiﬁcant even in the presence of ∆ROAy+1. When the
TAG decile 10 stocks are excluded from the regression in Panel B the variable remains marginally
signiﬁcant only in the EW portfolio regressions. Thus, there is evidence that the negative abnormal
returns among (high asset growth) debt retirers are due to overpricing, even though they are not
signiﬁcantly associated with analyst earnings forecast errors. The overpricing argument is re-inforced
by the evidence in Table 14 that the market-to-book ratio, M/By−1, is a highly signiﬁcant determinant
of the amount of debt retirement as is the lagged stock return, Rety−1.
The other part of the explanation for the pattern of abnormal returns is the ﬁnding that, in contrast
to debt issuance, the size of the debt retirement is positively related to future changes in proﬁtability,
∆ROAy+1. The positive coeﬃcients on ROAy and ∆ROAy suggest either that managers are more
inclined to make large retirements when their concern about reported earnings is alleviated by strong
and improving fundamental proﬁtability or that they are attempting to signal the improving prospects
of the ﬁrm.
It seems then that the pattern of returns that we observe for debt retirers in Table 2 is the result
of at least two oﬀsetting inﬂuences. On the one hand is the positive role of debt retirement as a signal
of good future operating performance. This is seen in the positive and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
on lnDRy in equations predicting changes in ROA and ROE reported in the ﬁrst two columns of
Table 10, and in the positive stock price response to changes in these variables seen in Table 11. On
the other hand is the market timing motive which leads ﬁrms to retire more debt when stock prices
are high as measured by the market-to-book ratio. We saw that this variable is associated with both
increased debt retirements and lower future returns.
In summary, we have found evidence that managerial motives for debt retirement include market
timing, risk reduction and signaling.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided new evidence on the determinants of ﬁrm ﬁnancing choices. In
particular, we have found evidence that the debt issuance decision is inﬂuenced by what we have
referred to as the ‘making the numbers’ motives of managers. Managerial concern with earnings
per share is well-attested and the MTN motive arises from the possibility of improving reported
earnings per share by relying more heavily on debt to ﬁnance asset expansion when earnings yields
exceed debt yields. We do indeed ﬁnd that there is more reliance on debt ﬁnancing when earnings
yields are high relative to debt yields. We argue that the making the numbers motive is likely to be
strongest when managers are under pressure as the result of poor past performance, poor prospects
for future performance, and excessive market expectations about future performance. In support of
23this, we ﬁnd that reliance on debt ﬁnancing is greatest when past stock returns have been poor,
when Return on Assets is expected to deteriorate, and when analysts are over-estimating future
earnings. Increased reliance on debt ﬁnancing is a strong predictor of lower future ROA and ROE,
of positive analyst earnings forecast errors, and of low future stock returns. This is consistent with
managerial eﬀorts to oﬀset the eﬀects on earnings of deteriorating fundamentals by increased reliance
on debt ﬁnancing. The eﬀorts are only partially successful and when the market catches up with the
deteriorating fundamentals, negative stock returns ensue.
The negative dependence of debt ﬁnancing on past stock returns and the lagged market-to-book
ratio suggests an element of market timing in ﬁnancing choices. However, there is no evidence among
debt issuers that the market-to-book ratio forecasts future stock returns and the fact that higher debt
issuance forecasts lower future stock returns implies that there is more reliance on debt ﬁnancing when
stock prices are too high, the opposite of the market timing story.
We also ﬁnd that ceteris paribus debt ﬁnancing is decreasing in a measure of asset risk and in a
measure of the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to the stock price. This is consistent with managerial
risk aversion also playing a role in ﬁnancing decisions.30 However, we also ﬁnd that ﬁrms in the highest
quartile of debt issuers actually have higher risk as measured by our proxy than ﬁrms in the middle
quartiles of debt issuance. We interpret this as evidence of managers in serious straits ‘swinging for
the fence’, and we ﬁnd evidence that CEO’s of ﬁrms in this highest quartile of debt issuers are more
likely to be replaced in the next three years.
The combination of deteriorating fundamentals, over-optimistic analysts and negative future stock
returns for ﬁrms that rely heavily on debt ﬁnance suggests that the market is slow to comprehend the
prospects of these ﬁrms despite the cue implicit in the debt ﬁnancing, and that when it does catch up
to the change in ROA and ROE the stock price undergoes a negative adjustment.
The motives for debt retirement seem more mixed. We ﬁnd strong evidence that debt retirements
are associated with high asset risk and that they are also positively associated with the stock price
sensitivity of CEO pay which suggests that managerial risk control is an important consideration. We
ﬁnd little evidence that the managers of debt retirers are under pressure to ‘make the numbers’. On
the contrary, debt retirement is associated with good and improving proﬁtability so that retirement is
a positive signal of future prospects. At the same time, debt retirement like debt issuance is a predictor
of lower future stock returns. However this eﬀect is concentrated mainly among ﬁrms which reduce
their debt despite high asset growth. These ﬁrms appear to be taking advantage of overpricing of their
stock, and there is evidence, particularlyamong these high asset growth ﬁrms, that the market-to-book
ratio predicts future abnormal returns.
More generally, we have provided new evidence that managerial concerns are of importance in
30Graham and Narasimhan (2004), and Malmendier et al. (2011) have demonstrated the importance of
individual managerial traits for corporate ﬁnancing decisions.
24ﬁnancing decisions. As the remarks of Myers quoted in the introduction suggest, these concerns will
diﬀer according to the condition of the ﬁrm and the manager and the terms and security of employment.
It is unlikely that our primarily linear speciﬁcations have captured adequately the interactions between
the various considerations that are important. But we hope to have shown that managerial concerns
deserve a more important role in positive theories and empirical studies of corporate ﬁnancing.
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28Debt Growth: DR4 DR3 DR2 DR1 Dzero DI1 DI2 DI3 DI4
Asset Growth
Panel A. Average Total Asset Growth
Low -0.389 -0.285 -0.274 -0.279 -0.359 -0.301 -0.299 -0.299 -0.331
2 -0.106 -0.098 -0.098 -0.098 -0.130 -0.100 -0.097 -0.100 -0.102
3 -0.036 -0.034 -0.033 -0.033 -0.046 -0.024 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026
4 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
5 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.040 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.052
6 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.076 0.084 0.085 0.086 0.087
7 0.117 0.116 0.115 0.117 0.124 0.126 0.125 0.129 0.129
8 0.180 0.181 0.178 0.181 0.192 0.186 0.186 0.190 0.195
9 0.324 0.315 0.309 0.310 0.329 0.305 0.303 0.314 0.343
High 1.570 1.214 1.099 0.922 1.488 0.859 0.745 0.884 3.031
Panel B. Average Total Debt Growth
Low -0.346 -0.119 -0.050 -0.012 0.000 0.007 0.025 0.062 0.225
2 -0.160 -0.068 -0.032 -0.008 0.000 0.006 0.022 0.051 0.195
3 -0.123 -0.049 -0.024 -0.006 0.000 0.005 0.017 0.039 0.143
4 -0.103 -0.038 -0.018 -0.004 0.000 0.005 0.018 0.039 0.107
5 -0.093 -0.032 -0.014 -0.003 0.000 0.006 0.021 0.042 0.115
6 -0.099 -0.029 -0.013 -0.003 0.000 0.008 0.027 0.051 0.115
7 -0.108 -0.030 -0.011 -0.003 0.000 0.013 0.041 0.070 0.144
8 -0.133 -0.031 -0.011 -0.002 0.000 0.019 0.060 0.102 0.192
9 -0.178 -0.041 -0.013 -0.002 0.000 0.032 0.102 0.170 0.296
High -0.416 -0.070 -0.021 -0.004 0.000 0.077 0.254 0.445 1.518
Panel C. Average Total Equity Growth
Low 0.005 -0.111 -0.175 -0.221 -0.457 -0.265 -0.270 -0.314 -0.499
2 0.046 -0.015 -0.046 -0.067 -0.112 -0.085 -0.104 -0.118 -0.265
3 0.064 0.014 -0.006 -0.020 -0.036 -0.022 -0.032 -0.053 -0.148
4 0.075 0.027 0.014 0.008 -0.003 0.009 -0.001 -0.016 -0.081
5 0.094 0.048 0.033 0.026 0.031 0.026 0.019 0.004 -0.060
6 0.125 0.088 0.051 0.050 0.054 0.043 0.033 0.020 -0.029
7 0.167 0.091 0.082 0.075 0.091 0.067 0.048 0.030 -0.025
8 0.219 0.139 0.119 0.120 0.136 0.097 0.068 0.048 -0.016
9 0.346 0.250 0.221 0.219 0.240 0.169 0.114 0.076 0.004
High 1.717 1.063 0.945 0.729 1.224 0.568 0.303 0.267 0.833
Panel D. Average Firm Value
Low 1136 1804 1190 544 131 626 758 657 365
2 1764 2921 3586 1640 205 3744 1763 1044 986
3 2579 4761 4331 3338 382 4181 3600 2096 1925
4 3228 6685 6028 5463 462 5493 6308 4931 3691
5 2569 6682 7037 5669 642 9187 6992 7195 3499
6 2827 7334 6422 6607 798 9186 7530 6343 4251
7 3075 4624 5842 4987 911 6741 8573 7523 5459
8 2958 3749 6750 3602 1021 6426 5604 5879 2999
9 1406 3053 2669 2291 1686 5499 5363 5264 2484
High 680 777 921 1025 1262 3176 3881 3742 2466
Panel E. Average Total Equity Value
Low 181 352 200 177 36 116 -119 31 22
2 350 617 882 467 80 824 420 212 80
3 640 1102 1174 1022 170 1179 1008 508 332
4 751 1668 1521 1585 179 1433 1764 1202 536
5 612 1436 1894 1601 221 2457 1821 1700 735
6 698 1828 1589 1554 241 2289 1894 1428 1072
7 767 1216 1648 1167 273 1908 2140 1510 950
8 621 902 1554 978 256 1773 1372 1332 584
9 229 591 677 397 302 1406 1434 1058 509
High 119 205 285 233 231 848 1061 865 532
29Debt Growth: DR4 DR3 DR2 DR1 Dzero DI1 DI2 DI3 DI4
Asset Growth
Panel F. Average Number of Firms
Low 35 35 35 35 26 11 11 11 10
2 35 34 35 34 19 13 13 13 13
3 33 33 33 33 18 15 15 15 15
4 30 29 29 29 17 20 19 19 19
5 25 24 24 24 15 25 24 25 24
6 21 20 20 20 18 28 28 28 28
7 17 16 16 16 18 32 32 32 31
8 13 13 13 13 20 35 34 35 34
9 11 11 11 11 20 37 36 37 36
High 9 9 9 9 19 39 39 39 39
Panel G. Average Number of Firms with Negative Total Equity
Low 6 4 3 3 3 2 2 3 6
2 2 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 3
3 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 2
4 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
High 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Table 1: Average Annual Firm Characteristics for Portfolios formed on Total Asset
Growth and Debt Growth. The securities are sorted ﬁrst into 10 portfolios on the basis of Total
Asset Growth. The securities in each portfolio are then sorted by the change in the amount of total
debt over the year divided by Total Assets at the beginning of the year, where ﬁrms in sub-portfolios
DR1-DR4 reduce their debt and ﬁrms in sub-portfolios DI1-DI4 increase their debt. Portfolio Dzero
consists ﬁrms that do not change their debt outstanding. The sample period is from 1968 to 2010.
30Debt Growth: DR4 DR3 DR2 DR1 Dzero DI1 DI2 DI3 DI4
Asset Growth
Panel A. Value Weighted
Low -0.004 0.006* 0.001 -0.002 -0.004 0.003 0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(-1.57) (2.45) (0.35) (-0.85) (-1.18) (0.62) (0.57) (-0.54) (-0.53)
2 0.001 0.006** -0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.006
(0.52) (3.04) (-0.92) (1.18) (1.23) (0.28) (-0.66) (-0.01) (-1.70)
3 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.005
(-0.29) (1.93) (1.10) (0.05) (1.37) (1.64) (-0.46) (-1.34) (1.87)
4 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004* 0.001 -0.001
(1.00) (0.20) (1.48) (1.52) (0.37) (0.99) (2.00) (0.45) (-0.46)
5 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.94) (0.67) (0.39) (0.90) (1.19) (1.07) (0.88) (0.46) (0.89)
6 0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.005* 0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.80) (0.44) (-0.09) (2.37) (0.30) (1.11) (-0.01) (-0.35) (0.65)
7 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.006** 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003* -0.003*
(0.70) (0.91) (1.68) (2.72) (1.57) (1.34) (0.66) (2.36) (-2.01)
8 0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.006** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(1.23) (-1.13) (0.26) (0.63) (2.59) (0.14) (0.21) (-0.36) (-0.45)
9 -0.008** 0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.005*** -0.001
(-2.68) (0.51) (-0.81) (1.59) (0.77) (1.91) (0.83) (-3.41) (-0.33)
High -0.009* -0.003 -0.000 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004* -0.005** -0.009***
(-2.49) (-0.79) (-0.11) (-1.59) (-0.52) (-1.52) (-2.14) (-3.05) (-4.11)
Panel A. Equal Weighted
Low -0.001 0.003 0.006* 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.000 -0.006 -0.002
(-0.52) (1.56) (2.44) (1.23) (0.29) (1.09) (0.00) (-1.34) (-0.43)
2 0.002 0.005** 0.004** 0.004* 0.004 0.002 0.005 -0.000 -0.005
(1.26) (2.96) (2.64) (2.09) (1.28) (0.73) (1.41) (-0.05) (-1.31)
3 0.003* 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.002
(2.07) (2.99) (2.79) (2.93) (0.94) (1.60) (0.48) (-1.84) (0.66)
4 0.003* 0.004*** 0.003* 0.003 0.006** 0.004** 0.004* 0.001 -0.003
(2.00) (3.71) (2.45) (1.94) (2.87) (2.69) (2.51) (0.91) (-1.32)
5 0.002 0.003* 0.004* 0.003* 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.000 0.000
(1.56) (2.14) (2.31) (2.09) (0.97) (1.48) (1.42) (-0.22) (0.06)
6 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.005*** 0.003 0.003** 0.002 0.000 -0.002
(0.23) (0.74) (1.75) (3.43) (1.84) (2.61) (1.80) (0.10) (-1.22)
7 0.001 0.004 0.004* 0.004* 0.005* 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.001
(0.67) (1.93) (2.19) (2.35) (2.42) (1.25) (1.91) (1.93) (-0.70)
8 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004* 0.003* 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(1.18) (-0.31) (0.26) (1.82) (2.00) (2.27) (0.56) (0.75) (-0.57)
9 -0.009*** 0.001 -0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003* -0.002
(-3.57) (0.41) (-1.22) (1.22) (-0.09) (-0.14) (-1.41) (-2.13) (-1.28)
High -0.008* -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.010***
(-2.35) (-0.65) (-1.24) (-1.52) (-0.71) (-3.83) (-3.71) (-5.42) (-6.36)
Table 2: Abnormal Monthly Returns in months [7-18] on Portfolios sorted by Total
Asset Growth and Debt Issuance or Retirement. The table reports the intercepts from
OLS regressions of monthly excess portfolio returns (value and equally weighted) on the three
Fama-French factors. Each year 10 portfolios are formed by sorting ﬁrms on their Total Asset
Growth during the year. Firms within each asset growth portfolio are then assigned to one of 9
sub-portfolios based on the change in the Total Debt during the year expressed as a proportion
of the beginning of year total assets. Firms in sub-portfolios DR1-DR4 reduce their debt and
ﬁrms in sub-portfolios DI1-DI4 increase their debt. Portfolio Dzero consists ﬁrms that do not
change their debt outstanding. The abnormal returns are shown for months [7-18] following
December of the ﬁscal year which is used to construct the sorting criteria. The longest sample
period is from 1968 to 2010. t-statistics are reported in brackets. Asterisks correspond to the
following p-values: ∗p < 0.05,∗ ∗ p < 0.01,∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
31(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
FE(y − 1,y + 1) 0.224* 0.396** -0.030
(2.18) (3.24) (-0.16)
TAGy 4.298*** 5.535*** 3.555*** 5.978*** 7.289*** 6.059***
(13.02) (10.22) (12.37) (17.51) (12.98) (12.19)
D/Ay−1 -0.304* -0.093 -0.298* -0.236 0.224* -0.308
(-2.40) (-0.92) (-2.52) (-1.51) (1.98) (-1.58)
∆ROAy+1 -1.097** -2.204*** -2.570*** -3.535*** -3.241***
(-3.13) (-6.09) (-6.46) (-10.16) (-5.91)
M/By−1 -0.028* -0.025* -0.018* -0.005 0.004 0.013
(-2.54) (-2.22) (-2.44) (-0.38) (0.26) (0.72)
Rety−1 -0.140 -0.174** -0.122 -0.282*** -0.276*** -0.291*
(-1.10) (-2.93) (-1.11) (-5.06) (-4.74) (-1.97)
SDROAy+1 -11.391*** -15.538*** -9.248*** -13.918*** -18.093*** -10.843***
(-8.02) (-9.72) (-6.78) (-7.18) (-10.11) (-5.61)
(E/P)y−1 2.362***
(3.58)
(E/P)/Baay−1 0.013 0.097
(0.33) (1.13)
CEOstarty−1,y 0.070
(1.43)
SENSIy -0.237*
(-2.55)
Constant 1.173*** 1.482*** 0.905*** 1.462*** 1.724*** 1.277***
(4.95) (10.47) (3.78) (14.01) (11.65) (5.00)
Annual dummy variables No No No Yes No No
Obs. 15740 57920 16796 12795 47618 9879
Table 3: Predicting Debt Issuance and Retirement. The table reports the results of panel logit regressions for debt
issuance or retirement in year y. The dependent variable is equal to unity for a ﬁrm that issues debt and zero for a ﬁrm
that retires debt. FE(y-1,y+1) is the consensus forecast of earnings per share for year y +1 made at the end of year y −1,
scaled by the share price at the end of year y − 1. TAGy is the Total Asset Growth rate during year y. D/Ay−1 is the
ratio of the book value of debt to total assets at the end of year y − 1. M/By denotes the ratio between the market and
book value of equity at the end of year y. ∆ROAy+1 is the change in Return of Assets from y to y + 1, and SDROAy+1
is the cross-sectional standard deviation of this variable across ﬁrms in the portfolio to which the security is assigned in
Tables 2 and 3. Rety−1 is the stock return in y−1. (E/P)/Baay−1 is the ratio of the earnings per share to the average Baa
corporate bond yield in year y − 1. CEOstarty,y−1 is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a new CEO was appointed
in year y or y − 1. SENSIy is the proportional sensitivity of CEO pay to the stock price. In regressions that include the
earnings yield, E/P, observations are omitted when the earnings yield is negative. All variables are winsorized at the 1%
level and the errors are double-clustered. The longest sample period is from 1968 to 2010.
3
2(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Panel A: Value Weighted
ln (1+TAG)y -0.006
(-0.99)
ln TAGy -0.001
(-1.18)
ln DIy -0.001** -0.001
(-3.24) (-1.54)
∆ROAy+1 0.045* 0.037 0.038
(2.49) (1.75) (1.83)
∆ROEy+1 0.017** 0.006 0.005
(3.48) (0.88) (0.80)
FE(y,y + 1) -0.013**
(-3.46)
(M/B)y 0.000 0.000
(0.56) (0.95)
Constant -0.005** -0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(-3.23) (-0.87) (0.10) (-0.24) (0.67) (0.06) (-0.40) (-0.56)
R2 0.030 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.018 0.000 0.019
Panel B: Equal Weighted
ln(1+TAG)y -0.007
(-1.40)
ln TAGy -0.000
(-0.01)
lnDIy -0.002*** -0.001**
(-4.60) (-2.99)
∆ROAy+1 0.066** 0.029 0.028
(2.88) (0.90) (0.87)
∆ROEy+1 0.035*** 0.027* 0.026*
(6.20) (2.46) (2.41)
FE(y,y + 1) -0.010**
(-2.73)
(M/B)y -0.001 -0.000
(-1.55) (-0.51)
Constant -0.006*** -0.004 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001
(-3.97) (-1.59) (-0.25) (0.18) (0.91) (0.06) (1.16) (0.49)
R2 0.070 0.041 0.028 0.048 0.012 0.045 0.005 0.045
Table 4: Regression of Abnormal Returns for months 7-18 on selected variables
for Debt Issuers. The table reports the results of panel regressions of the abnormal return over
months 7-18 on the 40 Debt Issuance VW and EW portfolios on selected variables which are the equal
or value-weighted characteristics of the securities in the portfolios. TAGy is total asset growth in year
y; DIy is debt issuance in year y; ∆ROAy+1 (∆ROEy+1) is the change in Return on Assets (Equity)
from year y to year y + 1; FE(y,y + 1) is the average median analyst forecast error for earnings
per share in year y + 1 made in the last quarter of year y scaled by the share price at the end of
year y: it is set to missing if the share price is below one dollar. The sample period is from 1968 to
2010. Regressions that include FE(y,y+1) start in 1980 and regression (i) includes only portfolios for
which TAG > 0. All variables (except for log-variables and abnormal returns) are winsorized at the
1% level. The sample period is from 1968 to 2010. The reported standard errors are Driscoll-Kraay
(1998) standard errors that correct for a variety of dependencies including spatial dependencies.
33(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Dependent Variable ∆ROAy+1 ∆ROEy+1 FE(y,y + 1) FE(y − 1,y + 1)
ln(1+TAG)y 0.024** 0.016* -0.063*** -0.080***
(3.20) (2.38) (-4.20) (-9.82)
ln DIy -0.006*** -0.003** 0.007*** 0.004***
(-13.50) (-3.08) (5.08) (4.88)
ROAy -0.535***
(-40.24)
ROEy -0.639***
(-28.24)
Constant 0.007* 0.042*** 0.097*** 0.083***
(2.50) (7.55) (12.39) (25.83)
R2 0.2912 0.2852 0.0056 0.0157
Table 5: Regressions of Changes in Return on Assets, Return on Equity, and Fore-
cast Errors on TAG and DI for Issuers. The table reports the results of panel regressions
of changes in Return on Assets and Return on Equity from year y to year y + 1, and forecast
errors of year y+1 earnings per share, on lagged values of the variables and asset growth (TAG)
and debt issuance (DI) in year y. Firms are included in the regression only if their debt issue
is positive in year y. ROE is set to missing if the share price is below one dollar. FE(y,y + 1)
is the forecast error of earnings per share in year y + 1 made at the end of year y scaled by
the share price at the end of year y. All variables (except for logs) are winsorized at the 1%
level. The sample period is 1968-2010. The reported standard errors are Driscoll-Kraay (1998)
standard errors that correct for a variety of dependencies including spatial dependencies.
34Debt Growth: DI1 DI2 DI3 DI4 DI4-DI1 DI1 DI2 DI3 DI4 DI4-DI1
Asset Growth Value Weighted Equal Weighted
Panel A. Return on Assets: y − 1
Low 0.013 0.008 0.004 0.030 0.017 -0.041 -0.045 -0.052 -0.045 -0.004
2 0.082 0.064 0.075 0.071 -0.011 0.025 0.030 0.031 0.035 0.010
3 0.091 0.105 0.082 0.098 0.007 0.072 0.070 0.059 0.056 -0.016
4 0.121 0.106 0.112 0.092 -0.029 0.09 0.088 0.083 0.063 -0.027
5 0.136 0.116 0.107 0.121 -0.015 0.105 0.098 0.089 0.083 -0.022
6 0.148 0.135 0.129 0.120 -0.028 0.118 0.105 0.102 0.090 -0.028
7 0.172 0.143 0.126 0.130 -0.042 0.133 0.113 0.104 0.094 -0.039
8 0.185 0.152 0.132 0.132 -0.053 0.14 0.122 0.116 0.094 -0.046
9 0.185 0.173 0.147 0.137 -0.048 0.147 0.134 0.124 0.104 -0.043
High 0.169 0.160 0.151 0.145 -0.024 0.128 0.126 0.127 0.103 -0.025
Panel B. Return on Equity year y − 1
Low -0.087 -0.064 -0.118 -0.158 -0.071 -0.163 -0.167 -0.193 -0.261 -0.098
2 0.068 0.009 0.057 -0.004 -0.072 -0.042 -0.040 -0.037 -0.084 -0.042
3 0.098 0.125 0.057 0.116 0.018 0.04 0.041 0.030 0.006 -0.034
4 0.155 0.137 0.147 0.110 -0.045 0.091 0.098 0.074 0.027 -0.064
5 0.150 0.158 0.152 0.151 0.001 0.111 0.115 0.102 0.065 -0.046
6 0.175 0.190 0.182 0.153 -0.022 0.129 0.128 0.124 0.089 -0.040
7 0.185 0.198 0.188 0.164 -0.021 0.141 0.134 0.129 0.093 -0.048
8 0.209 0.203 0.185 0.164 -0.045 0.149 0.139 0.146 0.088 -0.061
9 0.215 0.213 0.190 0.168 -0.047 0.152 0.151 0.148 0.112 -0.040
High 0.204 0.199 0.184 0.170 -0.034 0.112 0.135 0.130 0.098 -0.014
Panel C. Market to Book Ratio year y − 1
Low 2.187 2.369 2.278 2.691 0.504 2.075 1.916 1.767 2.491 0.416
2 1.887 1.832 2.421 2.598 0.711 1.662 1.585 1.754 2.082 0.420
3 2.108 2.092 1.785 2.730 0.622 1.717 1.603 1.463 1.878 0.161
4 2.499 2.135 2.432 2.313 -0.186 1.685 1.646 1.607 1.682 -0.003
5 2.369 2.470 2.349 2.848 0.479 1.796 1.761 1.658 1.935 0.139
6 2.837 2.404 2.746 2.427 -0.41 2.089 1.835 1.822 1.862 -0.227
7 3.277 2.961 2.837 2.916 -0.361 2.229 1.998 1.919 1.925 -0.304
8 3.840 3.188 2.903 2.565 -1.275 2.536 2.185 2.092 1.963 -0.573
9 4.124 3.812 3.273 3.035 -1.089 3.076 2.481 2.316 2.305 -0.771
High 4.283 3.749 3.600 4.034 -0.249 3.449 2.708 2.692 3.038 -0.411
Panel D. Leverage Ratio year y − 1
DI1 DI2 DI3 DI4 DI4-DI1 DI1 DI2 DI3 DI4 DI4-DI1
Low 0.235 0.247 0.246 0.260 0.025 0.195 0.212 0.223 0.232 0.037
2 0.233 0.248 0.273 0.257 0.024 0.230 0.264 0.272 0.255 0.025
3 0.240 0.261 0.281 0.257 0.017 0.257 0.289 0.299 0.285 0.028
4 0.227 0.266 0.280 0.290 0.063 0.259 0.296 0.308 0.294 0.035
5 0.231 0.305 0.327 0.288 0.057 0.259 0.319 0.328 0.290 0.031
6 0.221 0.270 0.307 0.288 0.067 0.246 0.302 0.321 0.307 0.061
7 0.190 0.274 0.314 0.291 0.101 0.218 0.287 0.316 0.318 0.100
8 0.173 0.252 0.295 0.293 0.120 0.198 0.263 0.291 0.300 0.102
9 0.170 0.236 0.290 0.276 0.106 0.191 0.253 0.281 0.295 0.104
High 0.184 0.254 0.276 0.275 0.091 0.179 0.258 0.275 0.278 0.099
Panel E. Scaled Error in Forecast of year y + 1 Earnings made in year y − 1
Low 0.115 0.168 0.295 0.136 0.021 0.207 0.254 0.326 0.255 0.048
2 0.048 0.076 0.105 0.144 0.096 0.140 0.177 0.140 0.213 0.073
3 0.020 0.081 0.168 0.222 0.202 0.077 0.147 0.180 0.188 0.111
4 0.022 0.025 0.063 0.051 0.029 0.059 0.056 0.119 0.154 0.095
5 0.015 0.017 0.012 0.058 0.043 0.036 0.025 0.035 0.129 0.093
6 0.012 0.013 0.018 0.027 0.015 0.018 0.032 0.039 0.104 0.086
7 0.006 0.010 0.011 0.027 0.021 0.024 0.030 0.025 0.088 0.064
8 0.005 0.008 0.015 0.052 0.047 0.015 0.032 0.038 0.068 0.053
9 -0.001 0.013 0.014 0.023 0.024 0.028 0.034 0.027 0.066 0.038
High 0.010 0.015 0.025 0.038 0.028 0.057 0.044 0.067 0.104 0.047
Panel F. Abnormal Returns: Months -23 to -11
Low -0.016 -0.021 -0.024 -0.020 -0.004 -0.011 -0.017 -0.018 -0.015 -0.004
2 -0.015 -0.015 -0.012 -0.010 0.005 -0.015 -0.014 -0.013 -0.008 0.007
3 -0.009 -0.008 -0.014 -0.013 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.003
4 -0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.002
5 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001
6 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 0.002 0 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
7 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.003*
8 0.009 0.003 0.002 -0.003 -0.012*** 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.001 -0.007***
9 0.011 0.005 0.007 0.002 -0.009*** 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.004 -0.011***
High 0.016 0.008 0.007 0.009 -0.007*** 0.030 0.020 0.015 0.022 -0.008***
Table 6: Measures of Pressure on the Managers of Debt Issuers. The portfolios are ﬁrst
sorted by Total Asset Growth (TAG) and allocated to 10 deciles in increasing order. The deciles are
then sorted by the change in the amount of total debt over the year divided by Total Assets at the
beginning of the year. The table reports results only for ﬁrms that increase their debt outstanding
in year y (DIy > 0). DI1 consists of ﬁrm that have a small increase in debt and DI4 of ﬁrms that
have a big increase. The sample period is from 1968 to 2010. Asterisks correspond to the following
p-values: ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗ ∗p < 0.001.
35Debt Growth: DI1 DI2 DI3 DI4 DI4-DI1 DI1 DI2 DI3 DI4 DI4-DI1
Asset Growth Panel A. New CEO in y − 1 or y Panel B. New CEO in y + 1 or y + 2 or y + 3
Low 0.250 0.133 0.156 0.136 -0.114 0.114 0.133 0.250 0.273 0.159
2 0.133 0.254 0.244 0.200 0.067 0.120 0.169 0.222 0.150 0.030
3 0.109 0.088 0.122 0.118 0.009 0.109 0.184 0.122 0.132 0.023
4 0.071 0.122 0.057 0.123 0.052 0.093 0.169 0.101 0.090 -0.003
5 0.031 0.053 0.060 0.116 0.085 0.059 0.120 0.137 0.191 0.132
6 0.043 0.052 0.074 0.093 0.050 0.096 0.112 0.111 0.134 0.038
7 0.056 0.067 0.065 0.067 0.011 0.106 0.113 0.089 0.151 0.045
8 0.036 0.051 0.045 0.078 0.042 0.088 0.086 0.107 0.092 0.004
9 0.045 0.047 0.036 0.089 0.044 0.128 0.067 0.072 0.099 -0.029
High 0.028 0.050 0.039 0.035 0.007 0.099 0.112 0.142 0.106 0.007
Table 7: Proportions of New CEO’s for Debt Issuers The table reports the proportions of
new CEOs appointed around year y for ﬁrms in the respective asset and debt growth portfolios.
The total number of CEO changes is divided by the total number of observations in each
portfolio. The sample period is from 1992 to 2010.
36(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
D/Ay−1 -0.207*** -0.209*** -0.242*** -0.242*** -0.230*** -0.198*** -0.192*** -0.274***
(-12.73) (-13.49) (-16.51) (-16.59) (-14.63) (-15.17) (-14.30) (-11.32)
D/Ay−1 × TAGy 0.406*** 0.407*** 0.365*** 0.368*** 0.346*** 0.337*** 0.333*** 0.149***
(22.19) (19.41) (14.47) (15.10) (14.31) (10.66) (10.38) (3.37)
TAGy 0.264*** 0.264*** 0.285*** 0.286*** 0.298*** 0.326*** 0.327*** 0.353***
(24.09) (24.42) (21.06) (20.62) (21.46) (26.95) (27.23) (25.29)
ROAy -0.157*** -0.195*** -0.211*** -0.167*** -0.180*** -0.264*** -0.243*** -0.210***
(-7.93) (-8.48) (-4.99) (-3.81) (-4.31) (-14.13) (-12.05) (-3.96)
Rety -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.011**
(-12.54) (-11.01) (-8.12) (-8.30) (-11.48) (-5.88) (-7.55) (-2.84)
Rety−1 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.013***
(-6.64) (-5.76) (-5.63) (-5.93) (-7.15) (-5.27) (-5.73) (-3.72)
SDROAy+1 -0.147** -0.172** -0.198** -0.196** -0.161* -0.196*** -0.225** -0.410***
(-2.63) (-2.93) (-2.81) (-2.80) (-2.46) (-3.60) (-3.25) (-5.19)
∆ROAy 0.018 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.031 -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.072*
(1.18) (0.87) (0.87) (0.91) (1.76) (-3.92) (-3.53) (-2.14)
(M/B)y−1 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001
(-4.91) (-4.79) (-0.80) (-0.88) (-0.73) (-0.44) (-1.65) (1.22)
∆ROAy+1 -0.086*** -0.080*** -0.065*** -0.049*** -0.035*
(-5.58) (-3.81) (-7.19) (-5.32) (-2.27)
FE(y,y + 1) 0.001 0.009*
(0.25) (1.99)
FE(y − 1,y) 0.034***
(4.33)
(E/P)/Baay−1 0.003*
(2.09)
(E/P)y−1 0.054*** 0.035
(3.86) (1.40)
CEOstarty−1,y 0.004
(1.19)
SENSIy -0.027*
(-2.18)
Constant 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.175*** 0.173*** 0.168*** 0.136*** 0.116*** 0.148***
(13.77) (13.73) (13.20) (13.32) (13.12) (15.19) (11.61) (13.84)
R2 0.580 0.587 0.599 0.597 0.592 0.636 0.642 0.689
Annual dummy variables No No No No No No Yes No
Obs. 36128 33806 19530 19532 19959 27845 27845 5453
Table 8: Regression of Debt Growth in y for Debt Issuers. The table reports the results
of panel regressions of debt growth in year y on several explanatory variables. We include only ﬁrms
that issue debt in year y (DIy > 0). For regressions that include the earnings yield, E/P, only ﬁrms
with positive earnings in year y−1 are included. See Table 4 for variable deﬁnitions. All variables are
winsorized at the 0.1% level. The reported standard errors are Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors
that correct for a variety of dependencies including spatial dependencies. The longest sample period
is 1968 to 2010.
37Standard deviation of change in Return on Assets from year y to year y + 1
Debt Growth: DI1 DI2 DI3 DI4 DI4-DI1 DI4 minus DI1 minus
Asset Growth Avg.( DI2,DI3) Avg. (DI2,DI3)
Low 0.194 0.179 0.201 0.235 0.041 0.045 0.004
2 0.108 0.111 0.119 0.144 0.036 0.029 -0.007
3 0.064 0.079 0.085 0.112 0.048 0.030 -0.018
4 0.064 0.056 0.064 0.094 0.030 0.034 0.004
5 0.060 0.053 0.053 0.083 0.023 0.030 0.007
6 0.061 0.048 0.057 0.073 0.012 0.021 0.008
7 0.065 0.060 0.056 0.080 0.015 0.022 0.007
8 0.084 0.070 0.066 0.092 0.008 0.024 0.016
9 0.101 0.081 0.082 0.096 -0.005 0.015 0.020
High 0.171 0.126 0.125 0.187 0.016 0.062 0.046
Average 0.097 0.086 0.091 0.120 0.022 0.031 0.009
Table 9: Risk Characteristics of Debt Issuers. The portfolios are ﬁrst sorted by Total Asset
Growth (TAG) and allocated to 10 deciles in increasing order. The deciles are then sorted by the
change in the amount of total debt over the year divided by Total Assets at the beginning of the year.
The table reports results only for ﬁrms that increase their debt outstanding in year y (DIy > 0). DI1
consists of ﬁrms that have a small increase in debt and DI4 of ﬁrms that have a big increase. The
sample period is from 1968 to 2010.
38(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Panel A: Value Weighted Panel B: Equal Weighted
ln(1+TAG)y -0.006* -0.012***
(-2.41) (-5.90)
ln DRy -0.001* -0.001*
(-2.38) (-2.35)
∆ROAy+1 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.071*** 0.044** 0.042**
(8.88) (6.09) (6.14) (5.39) (3.08) (3.12)
∆ROEy+1 0.017*** 0.005 0.003 0.037*** 0.024* 0.019
(4.81) (1.19) (0.86) (4.59) (2.28) (1.91)
FE(y, y + 1) -0.015** -0.007
(-2.71) (-1.97)
(M/B)y -0.001* -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001*
(-2.58) (-1.50) (-4.31) (-2.42)
Constant -0.002 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.002** 0.002** -0.000 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(-1.31) (1.86) (2.18) (1.34) (2.07) (3.19) (2.71) (-0.33) (4.05) (4.91) (1.31) (4.55) (6.49) (5.95)
R2 0.016 0.027 0.016 0.005 0.031 0.005 0.033 0.060 0.044 0.054 0.003 0.063 0.029 0.071
Panel C: Value Weighted Panel D: Equal Weighted
excluding Asset Growth decile 10 excluding Asset Growth decile 10
ln(1+TAG)y 0.001 -0.009*
(0.24) (-2.69)
ln DRy -0.001 -0.001*
(-1.87) (-2.22)
∆ROAy+1 0.044*** 0.038** 0.038*** 0.069*** 0.011 0.011
(4.25) (3.57) (3.64) (3.90) (0.67) (0.68)
∆ROEy+1 0.012** 0.004 0.004 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.039***
(3.25) (1.15) (1.03) (5.75) (4.67) (4.45)
FE(y, y + 1) -0.009 -0.005
(-1.34) (-1.07)
(M/B)y -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(-1.02) (-0.66) (-1.95) (-0.41)
Constant -0.001 0.001** 0.002** 0.002* 0.001** 0.002* 0.002* -0.001 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(-0.71) (2.75) (3.15) (2.70) (2.89) (2.63) (2.40) (-0.35) (4.75) (5.74) (2.88) (5.78) (4.90) (4.22)
R2 0.005 0.015 0.008 0.002 0.016 0.001 0.016 0.025 0.032 0.059 0.002 0.059 0.009 0.060
Table 10: Regression of Abnormal Returns for months 7-18 on selected variables for Debt Retirers. The
table reports the results of panel regressions of changes in Return on Assets and Return on Equity from year y to year y + 1, and
forecast errors of year y + 1 earnings per share, on lagged values of the variables and asset growth (TAG) and debt issuance (DI)
in year y. Firms are included in the regression only if their debt retirement is positive in year y. ROE is set to missing if the share
price is below one dollar. FE(y,y + 1) is the forecast error of earnings per share in year y + 1 made at the end of year y scaled by
the share price at the end of year y. All variables (except for logs) are winsorized at the 1% level. The sample period is from 1968
to 2010. The reported standard errors are Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors that correct for a variety of dependencies including
spatial dependencies.
3
9(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
∆ROAy+1 ∆ROEy+1 FE(y,y + 1) FE(y − 1,y + 1)
ln(1+TAG)y 0.046*** 0.041*** -0.064*** -0.116***
(5.87) (5.91) (-4.49) (-8.68)
ln DRy 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.001 -0.001
(7.66) (5.32) (-0.58) (-0.93)
ROAy -0.465***
(-38.26)
ROEy -0.708***
(-50.72)
Constant 0.041*** 0.072*** 0.054*** 0.058***
(18.16) (20.98) (10.51) (9.88)
R2 0.2142 0.4043 0.0049 0.0197
Panel B: excluding Asset Growth decile 10
ln(1+TAG)y 0.029** 0.047*** -0.081*** -0.173***
(3.13) (3.71) (-3.87) (-8.86)
ln DRy 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.002* -0.004**
(6.91) (6.12) (-2.22) (-3.28)
ROAy -0.376***
(-25.22)
ROEy -0.688***
(-51.72)
Constant 0.037*** 0.074*** 0.046*** 0.043***
(14.40) (18.26) (11.56) (8.81)
R2 0.131 0.372 0.004 0.029
Obs. 33148 28112 17858 8935
Panel C: excluding Asset Growth deciles 9 &10
ln(1+TAG)y 0.026** 0.044*** -0.083*** -0.174***
(2.84) (3.29) (-3.77) (-8.28)
ln DRy 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.002* -0.004***
(6.71) (6.15) (-2.24) (-3.54)
ROAy -0.345***
(-17.69)
ROEy -0.683***
(-53.72)
Constant 0.036*** 0.075*** 0.045*** 0.042***
(12.96) (18.83) (10.08) (7.17)
R2 0.107 0.360 0.004 0.026
Obs. 31420 26661 16816 8504
Table 11: Regressions of Changes in Return on Assets, Return on Equity, and Fore-
cast Errors on TAG and DI for Retirers. The table reports the results of panel regressions
of changes in Return on Assets and Return on Equity from year y to year y + 1, and forecast errors
of year y + 1 earnings per share, on lagged values of the variables and asset growth (TAG) and debt
issuance (DI) in year y. Firms are included in the regression only if their debt retirement is positive
in year y. ROE is set to missing if the share price is below one dollar. FE(y,y + 1) is the forecast
error of earnings per share in year y+1 made at the end of year y scaled by the share price at the end
of year y. All variables (except for logs) are winsorized at the 1% level. The sample period is from
1968 to 2010. The reported standard errors are Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors that correct for
a variety of dependencies including spatial dependencies.
40Debt Growth: DI1 DI2 DI3 DI4 DI4-DI1 DI1 DI2 DI3 DI4 DI4-DI1
Asset Growth Value Weighted Equal Weighted
Panel A. Return on Assets: y − 1
DR4 DR3 DR2 DR1 DR4-DR1 DR4 DR3 DR2 DR1 DR4-DR1
Low 0.045 0.049 0.052 0.023 0.022 0.008 0.004 -0.01 -0.035 0.043
2 0.094 0.085 0.077 0.071 0.023 0.059 0.053 0.04 0.026 0.033
3 0.110 0.098 0.104 0.092 0.018 0.082 0.076 0.069 0.057 0.025
4 0.136 0.114 0.116 0.122 0.014 0.099 0.089 0.091 0.086 0.013
5 0.136 0.132 0.136 0.141 -0.005 0.105 0.105 0.098 0.098 0.007
6 0.147 0.145 0.150 0.156 -0.009 0.115 0.114 0.115 0.116 -0.001
7 0.135 0.169 0.163 0.190 -0.055 0.118 0.122 0.128 0.14 -0.022
8 0.168 0.180 0.194 0.207 -0.039 0.133 0.129 0.132 0.162 -0.029
9 0.144 0.195 0.177 0.212 -0.068 0.127 0.139 0.12 0.17 -0.043
High 0.132 0.125 0.119 0.183 -0.051 0.133 0.085 0.063 0.123 0.010
Panel B. Return on Equity year y − 1
Low -0.043 -0.005 0.007 -0.040 -0.003 -0.204 -0.140 -0.11 -0.128 -0.076
2 0.046 0.066 0.068 0.059 -0.013 -0.038 -0.008 -0.015 -0.024 -0.014
3 0.101 0.106 0.115 0.089 0.012 0.039 0.051 0.048 0.028 0.011
4 0.154 0.138 0.148 0.139 0.015 0.078 0.081 0.086 0.075 0.003
5 0.149 0.170 0.172 0.177 -0.028 0.089 0.112 0.105 0.107 -0.018
6 0.181 0.185 0.185 0.174 0.007 0.112 0.122 0.13 0.122 -0.010
7 0.156 0.210 0.193 0.208 -0.052 0.094 0.133 0.144 0.144 -0.050
8 0.206 0.217 0.235 0.222 -0.016 0.119 0.123 0.151 0.165 -0.046
9 0.164 0.204 0.163 0.226 -0.062 0.069 0.122 0.105 0.158 -0.089
High 0.005 0.133 0.103 0.199 -0.194 0.027 0.031 -0.005 0.089 -0.062
Panel C. Market to Book Ratio year y − 1
Low 2.141 1.91 2.016 2.056 0.085 1.445 1.394 1.403 1.683 -0.238
2 2.572 1.908 1.935 1.967 0.605 1.652 1.331 1.402 1.562 0.090
3 2.628 2.228 2.389 2.052 0.576 1.766 1.588 1.550 1.605 0.161
4 2.801 2.295 2.507 2.454 0.347 1.982 1.691 1.700 1.833 0.149
5 2.830 2.931 2.647 2.889 -0.059 2.202 1.993 1.874 1.951 0.251
6 3.463 2.888 3.014 2.907 0.556 2.360 2.053 2.156 2.097 0.263
7 3.262 3.890 3.195 3.911 -0.649 2.588 2.457 2.358 2.649 -0.061
8 4.104 3.663 3.934 4.102 0.002 2.926 2.693 2.782 3.146 -0.220
9 4.897 4.025 4.490 5.120 -0.223 3.616 3.205 3.647 4.048 -0.432
High 5.641 4.670 5.177 5.274 0.367 4.428 3.894 4.348 4.818 -0.390
Panel D. Leverage Ratio year y − 1
DR4 DR3 DR2 DR1 DR4-DR1 DR4 DR3 DR2 DR1 DR4-DR1
Low 0.479 0.369 0.293 0.210 0.269 0.520 0.363 0.283 0.184 0.336
2 0.391 0.349 0.296 0.228 0.163 0.422 0.356 0.303 0.204 0.218
3 0.342 0.324 0.289 0.250 0.092 0.389 0.337 0.305 0.226 0.163
4 0.321 0.301 0.268 0.224 0.097 0.362 0.317 0.294 0.220 0.142
5 0.338 0.270 0.236 0.206 0.132 0.348 0.291 0.253 0.213 0.135
6 0.294 0.250 0.218 0.195 0.099 0.325 0.254 0.244 0.177 0.148
7 0.280 0.211 0.196 0.139 0.141 0.309 0.227 0.208 0.141 0.168
8 0.280 0.203 0.170 0.112 0.168 0.327 0.212 0.182 0.104 0.223
9 0.296 0.213 0.143 0.086 0.210 0.333 0.218 0.149 0.088 0.245
High 0.387 0.203 0.164 0.091 0.296 0.410 0.203 0.147 0.070 0.340
Panel E. Scaled Error in Forecast of year y + 1 Earnings made in year y − 1
Low 0.190 0.065 0.197 0.138 0.052 0.198 0.138 0.190 0.276 -0.078
2 0.027 0.051 0.061 0.074 -0.047 0.069 0.102 0.132 0.141 -0.072
3 0.021 0.047 0.068 0.035 -0.014 0.032 0.055 0.057 0.078 -0.046
4 0.012 0.016 0.030 0.021 -0.009 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.060 -0.016
5 0.007 0.013 0.012 0.012 -0.005 0.012 0.023 0.031 0.032 -0.020
6 0.005 0.005 0.012 0.004 0.001 0.020 0.015 0.017 0.021 -0.001
7 0.015 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.034 0.013 0.017 -0.009
8 -0.005 0.010 -0.002 0.009 -0.014 0.022 0.018 0.018 0.033 -0.011
9 0.002 0.011 0.013 0.012 -0.010 0.039 0.003 0.003 0.018 0.021
High 0.103 0.012 0.032 0.066 0.037 0.079 0.083 0.077 0.116 -0.037
Panel F. Abnormal Returns: Months -23 to -11
Low -0.019 -0.019 -0.023 -0.019 0 -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.016*** -0.007
2 -0.012 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 0.002 -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.002
3 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.006 -0.001 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.001
4 -0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.005*** -0.004** -0.002 0.002
5 -0.002 0 -0.001 0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.002
6 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.008*** 0.005** 0.004** 0.004 0.004
7 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.011*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.004
8 0.011 0.009 0.015 0.01 0.001 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.000
9 0.019 0.012 0.015 0.013 0.006 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.001
High 0.027 0.023 0.026 0.029 -0.002 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.037*** 0.036*** -0.006
Table 12: Measures of Pressure on Managers of Debt Retirers. The portfolios are ﬁrst
sorted by Total Asset Growth (TAG) and allocated to 10 deciles in increasing order. The deciles are
then sorted by the change in the amount of total debt over the year divided by Total Assets at the
beginning of the year. The table reports results only for ﬁrms that reduce their outstanding debt in
year y (DRy > 0). DR1 consists of ﬁrm that have a small reduction in debt and DR4 of ﬁrms that
have a big decrease. The sample period is from 1968 to 2010. Asterisks correspond to the following
p-values: ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗ ∗p < 0.001.
41Debt Growth: DR4 DR3 DR2 DR1 DR4-DR1 DR4 DR3 DR2 DR1 DR4-DR1
Asset Growth Panel A. New CEO in y − 1 or y Panel B. New CEO in y + 1 or y + 2 or y + 3
Low 0.171 0.163 0.185 0.209 -0.038 0.101 0.170 0.097 0.116 -0.015
2 0.106 0.136 0.170 0.142 -0.036 0.130 0.136 0.122 0.125 0.005
3 0.125 0.105 0.104 0.092 0.033 0.118 0.124 0.128 0.123 -0.005
4 0.073 0.080 0.088 0.061 0.012 0.094 0.105 0.135 0.131 -0.037
5 0.100 0.078 0.071 0.066 0.044 0.052 0.152 0.078 0.132 -0.080
6 0.048 0.071 0.069 0.091 -0.043 0.070 0.123 0.116 0.087 -0.017
7 0.038 0.046 0.038 0.085 -0.047 0.115 0.082 0.104 0.068 0.047
8 0.055 0.043 0.048 0.029 0.026 0.083 0.104 0.048 0.059 0.024
9 0.048 0.090 0.080 0.055 -0.007 0.113 0.141 0.091 0.077 0.046
High 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 -0.021 0.174 0.029 0.156 0.106 0.068
Table 13: Proportions of New CEO’s for Debt Retirers The table reports the proportions
of new CEOs appointed around year y for ﬁrms in the respective asset and debt retirement portfolios.
The total number of CEO changes is divided by the total number of observations in each portfolio.
The sample period is from 1992 to 2010.
42(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
D/Ay−1 0.208*** 0.207*** 0.194*** 0.194*** 0.196*** 0.178*** 0.179*** 0.207***
(25.67) (27.85) (25.36) (25.46) (29.52) (34.78) (34.54) (21.11)
D/Ay−1 × TAGy -0.249*** -0.241*** -0.173*** -0.174*** -0.237*** -0.238*** -0.234*** -0.337***
(-9.32) (-8.49) (-5.11) (-5.10) (-6.84) (-9.04) (-9.08) (-11.82)
TAGy -0.000 -0.002 -0.012** -0.011** -0.011*** -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.019**
(-0.13) (-0.55) (-2.79) (-2.67) (-4.20) (-5.01) (-5.08) (-2.65)
ROAy 0.009 0.017** 0.025** 0.014* 0.030*** 0.059*** 0.067*** 0.074***
(1.70) (2.78) (3.15) (2.16) (4.45) (7.40) (8.23) (5.22)
Rety 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.013***
(20.09) (16.20) (10.84) (11.52) (16.52) (14.42) (12.78) (6.13)
Rety−1 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.009***
(7.96) (8.90) (10.62) (10.77) (7.93) (7.61) (15.51) (7.00)
SDROAy+1 0.152*** 0.156*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.148*** 0.165*** 0.171*** 0.132***
(8.24) (8.05) (9.03) (8.98) (8.84) (8.80) (8.46) (6.18)
∆ROAy 0.019*** 0.018** 0.013 0.012 0.014** 0.021** 0.020** 0.023**
(4.16) (3.23) (1.53) (1.41) (3.18) (3.22) (3.19) (2.74)
(M/B)y−1 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000
(7.02) (7.30) (9.88) (10.43) (9.26) (3.44) (2.97) (0.94)
∆ROAy+1 0.014* 0.026*** 0.002 0.004 -0.018
(2.52) (4.01) (0.23) (0.43) (-1.13)
FE(y,y + 1) 0.002 -0.000
(0.74) (-0.10)
FE(y − 1,y) -0.004
(-1.04)
(E/P)/Baay−1 -0.002**
(-3.07)
(E/P)y−1 -0.023*** -0.010
(-3.35) (-0.96)
CEOstarty−1,y 0.002
(1.20)
SENSIy 0.006*
(2.51)
Constant -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.048*** -0.060***
(-14.63) (-15.02) (-17.35) (-17.30) (-14.91) (-17.38) (-17.90) (-12.61)
R2 0.240 0.242 0.210 0.209 0.224 0.221 0.227 0.258
Annual dummy variables No No No No No No Yes No
Obs. 32418 29886 16727 16728 17819 21344 21344 4546
Table 14: Regression of Debt Reduction in y for Debt Retirers. The table reports the
results of panel regressions of debt reduction in year y on several explanatory variables. We include
only ﬁrms that retire debt in year y (DRy > 0). For regressions that include the earnings yield, E/P,
only ﬁrms with positive earnings in year y − 1 are included. See Table 4 for variable deﬁnitions. All
variables are winsorized at the 0.1% level. The reported standard errors are Driscoll-Kraay (1998)
standard errors that correct for a variety of dependencies including spatial dependencies. The longest
sample period is 1968 to 2010.
43Standard deviation of change in Return on Assets from year y to year y + 1
Debt Growth: DR4 DR3 DR2 DR1 DR4-DR1 DR4 minus DR1 minus
Asset Growth Avg.(DR2,DR3) Avg. (DR2,DR3)
Low 0.284 0.254 0.266 0.262 0.022 0.024 0.002
2 0.227 0.201 0.211 0.218 0.009 0.021 0.012
3 0.178 0.169 0.177 0.179 -0.001 0.005 0.006
4 0.161 0.137 0.148 0.154 0.007 0.019 0.012
5 0.175 0.139 0.134 0.128 0.047 0.039 -0.009
6 0.193 0.142 0.140 0.129 0.064 0.052 -0.012
7 0.213 0.139 0.117 0.136 0.077 0.085 0.008
8 0.219 0.173 0.149 0.140 0.079 0.058 -0.021
9 0.264 0.223 0.223 0.190 0.074 0.041 -0.033
High 0.324 0.312 0.301 0.264 0.060 0.018 -0.043
Average 0.224 0.189 0.187 0.036 0.151 0.036 -0.008
Table 15: Risk Characteristics of Debt Retirers. The portfolios are ﬁrst sorted by Total
Asset Growth (TAG) and allocated to 10 deciles in increasing order. The deciles are then sorted by
the change in the amount of total debt over the year divided by Total Assets at the beginning of the
year. The table reports results only for ﬁrms that reduce their debt outstanding in year y (DRy > 0).
DR1 consists of ﬁrms that have a small reduction in debt and DR4 of ﬁrms that have a big reduction.
The sample period is from 1968 to 2010.
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